

NPS ARCHIVE
1964
JOHNSTON, M.

Library
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

AN ABSTRACT

of

THE CONCEPT OF INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY
AND THE EIGHTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION
OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

by

Maurice M. Johnston

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

MASTER OF ARTS

May 1964

AN ABSTRACT

The concept of inter-American solidarity is based on the principles of social, cultural, and, ultimately, political unity of the peoples of the Western Hemisphere. This unity depends upon the observance of non-intervention, the right of self-determination of states in their national affairs, and the exercise of representative democracy. Through hemisphere economic cooperation, it is hoped to obtain the good life for all the people.

Implicit in the concept of solidarity is the need for security. In the present world environment of change, the transitional societies of the hemisphere are prey to revolutionary Communism which challenges traditional concepts and the social-political status quo of the Americas.

A case study of Fidel Castro's Cuba serves to illustrate and illuminate the apparent state of the mystique of American solidarity and points up the challenge to infuse it with new dynamism--only by so doing, can solidarity avoid utter fragmentation.

THE CONCEPT OF INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY
AND THE EIGHTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION
OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

by

Maurice M. Johnston

//

Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: _____

Date: _____

Dean of the School

Date: _____

100-154712E

1961

100-154712E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-01-01 BY 60322 UCBAW

10

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

11

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Library
U. S. Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

Copyright by
Maurice W. Johnston Jr.
1964

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE BASIS OF THE CONCEPT OF INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY	1
Introduction	1
The Concept of Solidarity	4
II. THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO SOLIDARITY	18
Introduction	18
The United States Views the Threat	19
Latin America Views the Threat	22
The Cuban Defection	26
III. MEETING THE THREAT TO HEMISPHERE SOLIDARITY	37
The Evolution of Anti-Communist Declarations	37
Reaction to Castro in the Hemisphere	45
A Hemisphere Divided on Remedial Action	57
IV. THE INTER-AMERICAN RESPONSE AT FUNTA DEL ESTE	66
The United States Position	69
The Attitude of the Central American States	76
Unanimity versus Sanctions	79
V. THE CASE OF SOLIDARITY EVALUATED	92
Conclusion	106
BIBLIOGRAPHY	109

CHAPTER I

THE BASIS OF THE CONCEPT OF INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY

I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of the solidarity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere is based on three broad principles. The first signifies a social and cultural, and ultimately a political unity among its peoples. The second is an important adjunct to the attainment of that unity: the principle of non-intervention in the sovereign affairs of neighboring states. This leads directly into the third principle which affirms that self-determination in national affairs will be the exercise of representative democracy; and, finally, that the good life for people living in such a society is best secured through economic cooperation among the American states.

Implicit in the concept of solidarity is the need to secure its explicit aspirations against the exercise of uncontrolled power by any state within the hemisphere and to repel any threat by forces alien to its principles from without the hemisphere.

In the first instance, what success the inter-American system has had in maintaining its solidarity is

due to the manner in which a single member, possessing a preponderance of military, economic, and political power, has exercised restraint in the use of that power in its relations with twenty smaller and weaker neighbors.

Simple restraint has not always been enough, however. Given the vast disparity of power between the United States and her hemisphere neighbors, not only action, but inaction as well, have important effects on the fortunes of the other members of the system.¹ In spite of the fact that the desire of Latin Americans for an end to intervention in the narrow sense of the word has been largely satisfied, the subtler, but deeper, forms of influence in the matter, for example, of supplying or withholding military or economic aid by the United States, has been felt throughout the area. Bolivia is not economically viable without United States aid, and dispensing it generously or in a mere trickle would vitally affect Bolivian national life. The supply of military arms to Fulgencio Batista and the sudden withdrawal of this aid had decided psychological and morale, if not military, effect on the regime and its defeat by revolutionary forces. To spurn this kind of influence from one source

¹Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1943), pp. 276-294.

in the present international milieu of mutual interdependence is only to accede to it from another quarter--as Cuba has done. Rather than reject it, however, Latin America has long insisted upon not less but more economic aid, which, paradoxically, gives fuel to the fires of resentment over outside intervention in domestic affairs.

Ronald M. Schneider has noted that, in recent years, internal changes in Latin American societies have brought economic and social pressures to bear on dominant groups traditionally friendly to the United States which impel them to assert greater independence of action. The once consistent value systems of both upper and middle groups have been disrupted by the appearance of new ideological currents produced by urbanization and industrialization; humanistic emphasis is losing ground to the desire for more of the material benefits; popular expectations have outrun actual achievements; and the population explosion tends to aggravate all of the conditions demanding great social change.²

Against this background of underdeveloped nations in the midst of dynamic transition, it is little wonder

²Karl M. Schmitt and David D. Burke, Evolution or Chaos, Dynamics of Latin American Government and Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), introduction by Ronald M. Schneider, pp. 3-14.

that traditional concepts and usual practices in hemisphere relations have not escaped the challenge of revolutionary change which is being hurled at every aspect of the existing order of things.

Let us here attempt to grasp something of the diffuse nebulae of American solidarity as it had come to exist after World War II.

II. THE CONCEPT OF SOLIDARITY

By 1945 a consensus existed within the Americas about the concept of inter-American solidarity. Its principles were incorporated formally in the preamble and declarations of the Act of Chapultepec adopted by the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace convened in Mexico City in that year. In 1947 the high contracting parties to the Rio Treaty reaffirmed their adherence to these principles "all of which should be understood to be accepted as standards of their mutual relations and as the juridical basis of the Inter-American system."³

At Bogota, Colombia, in 1948, the Charter of Bogota established the international organization whose purpose

³Department of State, Publication 3016, International Conference Series II, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), preamble. Cited hereinafter as the Rio Treaty.

it was to promote the solidarity of the American states, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence.⁴ The preamble to the Charter states the conviction that the Americas have an historic mission to offer man a land of liberty and an environment favorable to the development of his individual personality and the realization of his just aspirations.⁵

This is a part of the political heritage of the West which in Latin America has sought to minimize the race and class distinctions which originated in the European conquest. It is part of Latin America's tradition which "includes a highly developed sense of individual freedom, equality, independence and human dignity, as well as devotion to the search for the good life."⁶ They are ideas which historical interpretation once credited to the Age of Enlightenment as inciting causes of the Latin American independence movement.⁷

⁴Pan American Union pamphlet, Charter of the Organization of American States (Washington, D.C.) Art. I; signed at the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, March 30-May 2, 1948. Cited hereinafter as the OAS Charter.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Harold E. Davis, Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958), p. 21.

⁷Arthur P. Whitaker (ed.), Latin America and the

It was the purpose of the Committee to have the
most complete and accurate record of the
work of the Committee, and to have it
published in a form which would be
available to the public. The Committee
has accordingly prepared a report which
contains a full and complete account of
the work of the Committee, and of the
results of its investigations.

The Committee has also prepared a
report on the work of the Committee
in the field of the study of the
history of the United States, and
on the work of the Committee in the
field of the study of the history of
the United States. The Committee
has also prepared a report on the
work of the Committee in the field of
the study of the history of the
United States, and on the work of
the Committee in the field of the
study of the history of the United
States.

The Committee has also prepared a
report on the work of the Committee
in the field of the study of the
history of the United States, and
on the work of the Committee in the
field of the study of the history of
the United States.

The Committee has also prepared a
report on the work of the Committee
in the field of the study of the
history of the United States, and
on the work of the Committee in the
field of the study of the history of
the United States.

Modern political theory generally rejects the simplistic version of ideas as the sole causal factor in major political changes, but ideas are the cohesive materials which bind the variables of international politics into meaningful human endeavor. With the emergence of an entire hemisphere freed from Old World hegemony, the fact of independence nurtured the presupposition of a larger and more embracing idea. Arthur Whitaker has called it the Western Hemisphere Idea,⁸ the core of which is the proposition that "the peoples of this Hemisphere stand in a special relationship to one another which sets them apart from the rest of the world."⁹ The premises of this special relationship are the conceptions of nature and of human nature underlying all political thought, which are shared by Americans. It is the idea of the rights of individuals and the moral responsibility of the citizen as a person which serves as the basis of constitutional democracy in the West.¹⁰ Each of these has

Enlightenment, "The Enlightenment and Latin American Independence," by Charles C. Griffin (New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 121.

⁸ Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea (New York: Cornell University Press, 1954).

⁹ Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁰ William Y. Elliott and Neil A. MacDonald, Western Political Heritage (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1949), p. 18.

found its place, explicitly set forth in the Charter of Bogota and in numerous resolutions of the governments meeting in the inter-American system.

The geographical proximity of the republics in the hemisphere, coupled with a cluster of social, cultural and political ideas, flavored with a dash of the mystical as well as the rational, had manifested itself in a unique connotation of political solidarity. Thus, as early as 1813, Thomas Jefferson was referring to that unity of the American peoples which extended to all their "modes of existence."¹¹ As recently as 1952 an eminent Mexican writer and diplomat, Luis Quintanilla, expressed the concept of solidarity in these terms:

Not only do geographical closeness and similar historical backgrounds bring us together, but we share in common an idea about the organization of society and of the world To face the fact of America is to glance at any map. From pole to pole, from ocean to ocean, we are all in the same boat, we were created to live together.¹²

Here, expressed and implied, are several of the ideas upon which Americans base the ethos of their association: geographical unity, common ideas and institutions, and a common experience in adapting to a new environment, and independence from Europe.

¹¹Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea, op. cit., p. 2.

¹²Ibid., p. 4, citing Luis Quintanilla.

The solidarity of the hemisphere was, in fact, born of and nourished by the determination to insulate America from Europe and its perpetual broils. But a shrinking world and the complexities of international life have always facilitated the inter-play between America and Europe which has periodically strengthened and paradoxically weakened the concept and its application on a regional basis. There are also strong tendencies toward fragmentation.¹³

However strong the bases of solidarity, its development has been paralleled by a strong dissent which denies it universal acceptance. For with the fear of Russian and French intervention in the hemisphere, there was born the American doctrine of non-intervention.¹⁴ It owes its birth to the hemispheric extension by the United States of her national policy of isolation inherited from Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Declaration of 1823.¹⁵

¹³Northwestern University, United States-Latin American Relations, The Organization of American States, a study prepared by Professors George Blanksten, Harold Guetzkow and John Plank for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 14. Cited hereinafter as OAS Study.

¹⁴Samuel P. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1943) pp. 48ff.

¹⁵Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea, op. cit., p. 24.

But not all Americans were converted to the hemisphere system in 1823.

Simon Bolivar's plan for international cooperation was not attuned to the idea of hemisphere solidarity but rather envisioned a Spanish-American union,¹⁶ linked for protection, not with a fledgling United States, but the powerful British nation.¹⁷ Far imperative to the sovereign independence of the former colonies was a source of power to defend their new status. A mutuality of defense interest quickened the nascent notion of solidarity among Americas, North and South. It was the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, marking the assumption by the United States of the traditional role of Great Britain as guarantor, however, that also marked the United States as a principal malefactor as well as chief benefactor of the hemisphere. Although the United States lacked the positive power at the time to make her guarantee good, fate was kind in extra-hemisphere relations and no challenge seriously threatened a renunciation of the responsibilities she had assumed. In the hemisphere, her preponderance of power over that of her neighbors became at once the most

¹⁶ Joseph B. Lockey, Pan Americanism: Its Beginnings (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920), p. 100.

¹⁷ Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea, op. cit., p. 25.

and the other two are in the same position as the first.

There is also

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

the same result as the first two, but the

valuable asset of the inter-American system and to some, its nemesis, because freedom from extra-continental intervention gave way to fear on the part of Latin American states of intervention by the "Colossus of the North." This was inspired by the Manifest Destiny and continental security calculus of the United States.¹⁸ Manifold interventions by the United States over the years have seen the resolution of the question of non-intervention into a negative absolute in inter-American affairs which lessens solidarity.

Similarly, from a germ of the concept of non-intervention contained in the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation, signed at the Panama Congress in 1826,¹⁹ through the law treatise of Dr. Carlos Calvo and the doctrine of Dr. Luis M. Drago,²⁰ the prohibition of forceful intervention to coerce a state has become an inclusive dogma which subjects almost any external actions by a state to the epithet "intervention,"²¹ and threatens solidarity from within.

¹⁸ Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History (Baltimore: The Macmillan Co., 1935), pp. 102-127.

¹⁹ A. J. and Ann W. Thomas, The Organization of American States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), p. 157.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 155.

²¹ A. J. and Ann W. Thomas, "Democracy and the OAS,"

...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...

...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...

¹ ...
² ...
³ ...
⁴ ...
⁵ ...
⁶ ...
⁷ ...
⁸ ...
⁹ ...
¹⁰ ...

However, the acceptance by the United States of the principle of non-intervention at Montevideo in 1933 and Buenos Aires in 1936 represented a signal victory for twenty smaller and weaker neighbors over a dominantly powerful Northern nation. The acquiescence to such a concession by a major world power exacted by the diplomacy of twenty individually and collectively weak nations is the spirit of the idea at the foundation of American solidarity. But as the concept of solidarity is paralleled by a dissenting consensus, so is the principle of non-intervention.

At the Congress of Panama, Bolivia proposed that member states should intervene to support constitutional governments against revolution. Pedro Felix Vicuna of Chile and Juan Bautista Alberdi of Argentina, each made proposals as early as 1837 and 1844, respectively,²² which anticipated the most notable expressions of interventionism in our day: the Doctrine of Rodriguez Larreta set forth in 1945, which proposed multilateral intervention in defense of human rights and democracy.²³ Article 5 of the

Minnesota Law Review, Vol. XLVI, 1961-1962 (Winneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1962).

²²Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea, op. cit., p. 54.

²³Pan American Union, Consultation of the Government of Uruguay and Replies of the Governments on the Parallelism Between Democracy and Peace, The International Rights

Charter of Bogota affirms that the solidarity of the American states requires the exercise of representative democracy, but also that

each state shall have the right to develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally /and/ shall respect the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality.²⁴

Often a discouraging outlook is conveyed by Latin American domestic politics. But the Church, a majority of the intelligentsia, and the developing middle class and urban working class share a disposition to broaden the base of political activity, to establish orderly processes for changing government, and reinforcing fundamental individual freedoms.²⁵ Unfortunately, human rights, like democracy, had been relegated to an inferior position in the inter-American programs of the Organization of American States by the era of absolute non-intervention. It was to receive a new stimulus following the Cuban revolution.²⁶ A strengthening of collective interest in restoring and

of Man and Collective Action in Defense of those Principles (Washington, D.C., 1946).

²⁴ Ibid.; OAS Charter, Art. 13.

²⁵ Charles O. Porter and Robert J. Alexander, The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America (New York: Macmillan, 1961), p. 43.

²⁶ John C. Greier, The Organization of American States (Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 103.

perpetuating human rights in accordance with the Charter of the Organization of American States through the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights remains, however, stymied by the old bugaboo of non-intervention.²⁷ Intervention of any kind to correct infractions of basic human rights has been held to be potentially more dangerous than their denial.²⁸

Another principle of solidarity is that economic cooperation is essential to the common welfare and prosperity of the peoples of the continent and that social security and social justice are bases of lasting peace.²⁹ This is an important principle having roots in the free and reciprocal trading policies formulated by the United States after gaining its independence.³⁰ Rapid industrialization in North America has left Latin America behind among the underdeveloped agrarian-based economies of the world. Here a disparity of power between the United States and twenty smaller and weaker nations, this time in economic matters, illustrates again the dominant importance of the Yankee nation in the American system.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 104-5.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 95.

²⁹ OAS Charter, op. cit., Art. 5.

³⁰ J. Fred Rippy, Globe and Hemisphere (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1958), p. 10.

Next to its acceptance of the principle of non-intervention, the task of exacting from the United States economic aid for their social betterment has been a major goal of the Latin republics. This line of endeavor has been both consistent and persistent and, in the main, envisaged by the Latins as a Marshall Plan for Latin America, consisting of massive and practically unregulated grants on a government-to-government basis after the fashion of the highly successful European economic recovery program.

The United States, however, had persisted in a laissez faire attitude toward economic, as well as social and cultural areas of aid.³¹ The possibility exists that the Cold War, with the concurrent threat to the hemisphere status quo will bring a change in this attitude; for, as far as the Latin Americans are concerned, the inter-American system is moving away from the philosophy of classical liberalism toward a philosophy that stresses the necessity and desirability of planning and state enterprise in economic and social areas.³²

The United States, as prime representative of a satisfied status quo, has found itself challenged by the

³¹ Northwestern University, op. cit., p. 21.

³² Ibid., p. 22.

...and the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...

...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...

...the ... of the ...
...the ... of the ...

forces of change in a way which it did not expect and in a context of "Cold War" with which it cannot, as a representative democracy, cope speedily and decisively. A struggle heretofore enacted painfully in the Eastern Hemisphere has chosen the Western half of the world as its stage. This American nation now finds its role reversed. Its revolutionary challenge to the colonial status quo of the eighteenth century made the United States once the champion of a transitional order. The vast frontiers of the New World, the fluidity of colonial rivalry manipulated by European monarchies made the American revolution--hallowed as it was by the symbol of personal freedom from tyranny--a cut above the squalid struggles in Europe for freedom and reform. Less than two hundred years later the United States has become a status quo power confronted by an economic and social revolution to which has been added the element of political "reform" advocated by communism.

As the principal defender of American solidarity against "Old World" corruption and intransigence, the United States is confounded by the fact that the very principles from which hemispheric cohesion derives--respect for national sovereignty and non-intervention--are themselves among the factors inducing fragmentation. The very action in which the hemisphere has demonstrated its solidarity most strongly, namely, cooperation against

outside powers to maintain national independence, itself emphasizes the individual autonomies of the nations.³³

There are other factors contributing to fragmentation; their expression in intense nationalism permeates the hemisphere. All the states of the hemisphere vary with respect to size, resource endowment, ethnic composition of their populations, social structure, political forms, and degree of economic development; with minor exceptions the Latin American states are not natural trading partners but competitors in the world market for the sale of a limited number of primary commodities. Finally, extra-hemispheric pulls tend to divide. The United States with worldwide commitments tends often to ignore Latin America for Europe; historically strong Latin ties with Spain and Portugal have become weaker,³⁴ and an increasingly disparate economic social relationship with a preoccupied United States has given rise to new speculations about Pan-Latin Americanism. Arthur Whitaker is of the opinion that there is a general trend "towards a strengthening of the solidarity of the Latin American group and a weakening of the group's ties with the United States."³⁵

³³ Ibid., p. 1.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 14.

³⁵ Arthur P. Whitaker, Nationalism in Latin America (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967), p. 62.

Countering these strong forces toward fragmentation, however, are factors inducive to inter-American solidarity. These, in the main, are those discussed earlier and are political and ideological. They derive from a common opposition to outside powers and from a widely held mythos that citizens of the New World share a common destiny in the pursuit of freedom. Some scholars have concluded that these forces for solidarity are weaker than those tending toward disunity.³⁶

In the presence of such views and with the purpose of judging the truth of such a conclusion in light of the Cuban situation and actions of the inter-American system of Punta del Este to deal with it, this thesis was undertaken. To the present time, few better cases pertinent to the concept of solidarity and its efficacy can be found than in the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which was convened to answer a threat to American solidarity.

³⁶Northwestern University, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

CHAPTER II

THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO SOLIDARITY

I. INTRODUCTION

The solidarity of the Americas has never been so pronounced as when the security of the hemisphere has been threatened by extra-continental powers. The present international tension between East and West, described as the Cold War, presents a situation which all American states cannot easily and readily identify as wholly inimical to their individual and collective interests. There are many and varied factors which enter into the evaluation of the Cold War situation by the Latin Americans. Of particular importance and impact, however, seem to be the feelings of nationalism, of sovereign independence from any external influences which might make it appear that they are less than equals in the international political system. Their increasing desire to be autonomous agents and to assert authority over their own sovereign lands and peoples has led to a less than unanimous and strong backing for the principles of solidarity.

This rent in the curtain of collective effort and achievement is in part due to the differing views taken by the United States and her twenty smaller neighbors toward

the threat of international Communism to the Americas. This chapter and the one which follows is a presentation showing some of the diversity of views, actions, and reactions to Communism in the hemisphere.

II. THE UNITED STATES VIEWS THE THREAT

In the view of the United States, the Cold War between the Western democracies and the Communist totalitarian states brought with it a serious threat to the solidarity of the Americas. This threat was recognized early by the United States, and its policy became increasingly geared to counter the expansionist nature of first Soviet, then Red Chinese, communist policies. Since shortly after World War II, it has been acutely aware that communist ideology and practice are militantly opposed to non-communist societies and that their subversion is a fundamental aim of the Communists.

The United States recognized that the most fertile field for Communist expansion was among underdeveloped and emerging national states. In Latin America, the political, social, and economic factors affecting the revolution of rising post-war expectations presented an environment of instability in which Communism could flourish. Nationalism, economic development, change in class relationships and the ideal of political democracy are basic components of

the revolution. These are interacting with the conditions of poverty, oppression, class and racial barriers and generally backward conditions which have precipitated a discontented indigenous population. The product is a continuing demand on the part of the masses for greater freedom, political participation, and social and economic equality.¹

While the United States has been relatively oblivious to these basic components of the Latin American social revolution, the Communists have been sensitive to each, exploiting their popular demands and representing the United States as the keeper of a status quo which bars their realization. The Communists have enlisted support for a variety of anti-imperialism campaigns which have invariably depicted the United States as the bane of Latin American revolutionary hopes and aspirations.² Playing upon latent suspicion and jealousy of their powerful Northern neighbor, the Communist influence has had remarkable success in capturing the imaginations of the peoples in transition in Latin America. The acquisition by Communists of a dominant role in Guatemala in the early

¹Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (first edition; New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1959), pp. 4-11.

²Ibid., p. 11.

1950's, the shocking treatment accorded Vice President Nixon in Lima and Caracas and, finally, the crowning irony of the Cuban defection to Communism, awakened the United States to the reality that the communist threat to American solidarity was present in the very hemisphere which Thomas Jefferson had once remarked was reserved to a distinct system of interest separated from the rest of the world.³ The United States was to begin to see that interest in terms of the economic and social revolution taking place and to appreciate the political consequences which it portended. Dr. Milton Eisenhower reported to the President, following his fact-finding visit through Latin America in 1953, that "foreign capital support is indispensable" to improve the economy of Latin America; a backward economy, in turn, provided the most fertile field for communist infiltration and conspiracy. He further reported that "economic improvement is the greatest single desire of the leaders and the peoples of Latin America."⁴

It became apparent that Latin America, indeed, had a different set of priorities and that combating the

³Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 29.

⁴Milton S. Eisenhower, "Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations," Department of State Publication 5290, Inter-American Series 47, December 1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 1-14.

communist threat did not take precedence over economic development.

III. LATIN AMERICA VIEWS THE THREAT

At the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Venezuela, 1954, the United States, with the Guatemalan situation in mind, proposed a discussion of the "Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics." The delegates from the Latin American republics showed that they did not share the anxiety of the United States regarding the threat of Communism, but seemed to vindicate the assessment of Dr. Eisenhower by placing a higher priority on massive economic assistance and reverence for the principle of strict non-intervention.⁵ The United States was present to seek a strong resolution against communist infiltration. She found unconditional support in this aim only from Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Peru, and Venezuela. Guatemala, Argentina, and Mexico flatly opposed, however, on the ground that any such resolution weakened the principle of non-intervention.⁶

⁵J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security 1889-1960 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1962), pp. 440-443.

⁶Ibid., p. 443.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles responded to these non-interventionists, saying, "The slogan of non-intervention can plausibly be invoked and twisted to give immunity to what is in reality flagrant intervention." But it was apparent, in any case, that there was little enthusiasm among the Latin Americans for an anti-communist resolution. In exacting one by the exertion of great pressure, the United States incurred strong resentment, even among those who voted in its favor.⁷

Professor Lloyd Mecham reserves judgment as to whether Caracas was a Pyrrhic victory for the United States, but concedes that, at least, "the Communists achieved their goal of using the Caracas conference as a propaganda platform."⁸

The Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against the Intervention of International Communism, which emerged, stated that the domination of any American state by international communism would constitute a threat to that state's sovereignty and independence, endanger the peace

⁷Ibid., p. 44.

⁸Ibid., p. 445. He also states that by the action of the Conference "the principle of the Monroe Doctrine became the common policy of the American republics," p. 444. A unique placement of a dubious event, if, indeed, the principle was ever common policy in the Americas.

of America, and require consultation to decide appropriate action.⁹ This language interpreted Article 6 of the Rio Treaty in such a way as to make collective measures for the common defense possible--even to collective intervention--to protect the principles of American solidarity.¹⁰ From a juridical point of view, the Declaration of Caracas could be interpreted as the acquiescence of Latin Americans in a truly forceful anti-communist policy. It is equally possible that this interpretation can be countered by one which emphasizes the freedom of a state to choose its own institutions and to determine for itself what domestic form its politics shall take. Latin America's most effective and consistent champion of this interpretation and the principle of non-intervention has been Mexico, who abstained from voting at Caracas.¹¹

Opposition on purely juridical grounds does not necessarily explain the heart of the resentment, however. This legal argumentation seemed to be merely symptomatic of a more deep-seated dissent. For example, the Mexican

⁹Department of State, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, March 1-28, 1954, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America with related documents. Publication No. 5692 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 156-157.

¹⁰A. J. Thomas and Ann V. Thomas, The Organization of American States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), p. 229.

¹¹Ibid., p. 357.

cultural review, Humanismo, commenting on the Caracas Conference, seemed to reflect the sympathy Latin-American nationalists, leftists, and intellectuals had for the Communist Arbenz regime as it faced the highly resented United States. Referring to the fiery Guatemalan Foreign Minister Guillermo Torriello Garrido, who so vigorously opposed the United States, Humanismo effused: "He interprets the music we like to hear and he attacks the things we disapprove He saved his country and covered himself with glory."¹² Professor Mecham quotes an Uruguayan source from Hoy as stating that they contributed their approval, but without enthusiasm, optimism, or joy and without a feeling of contributing to a constructive measure.¹³ Yet another scholar, Robert S. Alexander, takes the view that the United States used its full weight to induce the conference to take a position "uncongenial to the majority of Latin American countries," and in such a way as to lose friends and alienate the peoples of the southern part of the hemisphere. He saw Secretary Dulles as concerned only with the anti-communist resolution and indifferent both to the Latin American's fear of Yankee intervention and the concentration of their interest on

¹²Quoted in Mecham, op. cit., p. 445.

¹³Ibid., p. 444 (paraphrased).

economic and social problems.¹⁴ Professor C. Weale Ronning, expressing a more retrospective view, states categorically that the Caracas Resolution "has been anything but popular in Latin America."¹⁵

Against this background of "Conference solidarity," which concealed the real fragmentation of consensus about the nature and urgency of the communist threat to the hemisphere, the Castro regime in Cuba rejected the principle of solidarity with her American neighbors for a closer economic and political association with the Sino-Soviet bloc of nations.

IV. THE CUBAN DEFECTION¹⁶

Major Fidel Castro's revolutionary forces over-turned the regime of Colonel Fulgencio Batista and proclaimed a provisional government in Cuba on January 1, 1959. The fall of a tyrannical dictatorship was lauded

¹⁴Alexander, op. cit., pp. 400-401. Also cited, with comment, by Meham, op. cit., pp. 444-445.

¹⁵C. Weale Ronning, Punta del Este: The Limits of Collective Security in a Troubled Hemisphere (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1963), p. 3.

¹⁶This sub-chapter is based chiefly upon the chronological recapitulation of U.S.-Cuban relations since January 1, 1959 in A. G. Mezarik (ed.), Cuba and the United States (New York: International Review Service, Vol. I, 1960; Vol. II, 1963). These two volumes include pertinent matter of public record drawn from newspapers,

by almost no one and the promise of new freedom, equality, and economic and social advancement was welcomed by most of the peoples of the hemisphere and their governments.

During an unofficial visit to the United States in April, Castro stated that Cuba was not communist influenced and would not confiscate foreign private industries. He laconically asserted, however, that Cuba was not neutral in the East-West struggle.¹⁷

At home, the new revolutionary government dissolved all existing political parties except the Communist Party which it legalized. It dissolved the Congress; removed from office all Governors of Provinces, Congressmen, Mayors, and Aldermen; suspended the right of habeas corpus; ruled out new elections; and, by government decree, undertook sweeping economic and social reforms based on expropriated land redistribution.

The first dispute in Cuba's relations with an already wary and suspicious United States came over compensation to be paid for American property confiscated under the Agrarian Reform Law decreed by the Cuban Council of Ministers. The Cuban Government rejected the note

published documents, and public statements covering a period to 25 July 1963.

¹⁷Ibid., Vol. II, p. 56.

expressing "serious concern" sent by the United States, replying that it intended to accelerate agrarian reform, applying equal methods of expropriation and indemnification to nationals and foreigners alike, referring any case in doubt to competent Cuban courts.¹⁸

The problem of payment for expropriated capital assets was particularly appalling to nations who had large investments in Cuba and was an important factor in turning the tide of Cuban international relations. The implementation of reforms and anti-capitalist activity were designed to strengthen the revolution by bettering the social and economic life of the farmers and workers, and to achieve economic autonomy in the exploitation of Cuban natural and foreign developed assets.

Not all strata of Cuban society were supposed to benefit from these reforms. The anti-capitalist nature of the revolutionary movement was clear almost from the beginning, as moves were made to take over the mines, mills, and factories, and to regulate business. Hotels, newspapers, and commercial establishments were expropriated. These activities incurred the enmity of Cuban landlords, business and military men and investors, most of whom fled the country to carry on anti-Castro activities from their

¹⁸Ibid., p. 95.

new homes. The United States, as the largest single investor in Cuba, became increasingly hostile.¹⁹ In most Latin American regimes, hostility toward Castro grew apace. The ruling classes in these countries are made up of the very groups dispossessed in Cuba, and they began to desire the overthrow of the Castro Government.

But this was not a unanimous feeling by any means. Castro had become a hero in the eyes of a large number of depressed workers and peasants in Latin America by his actions to give more power and wealth to the poor of his country and by his challenges to the "Yankee Colossus." To capitalize this popularity among the peasant classes, Castro began militant denunciations of the regimes of other Latin American Republics. His offensive was first directed against the regimes in Paraguay, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. A continuing harangue was soon to be directed against Guatemala, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru. Several of these countries were to experience covert attacks and infiltrations sponsored by Cuba to topple their governments and further revolution in the region. The United States began early to put economic pressure on the Castro Government, embargoing certain exports and cutting sugar quotas.

¹⁹U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Business Investment in Foreign Countries (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 89.

In February 1960, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, on a visit to Cuba, had concluded trade and cultural agreements with Premier Castro. The USSR agreed to supply Cuba with crude oil, petroleum products, pig iron and steel; to purchase a million tons of sugar each year for the next five years; and to extend one hundred million dollars in credit. On May 8, the Soviet Embassy reopened in Havana, resuming diplomatic relations broken since 1952. In June, Czechoslovakia tendered twenty million dollars in credit and agreed to provide technical assistance.²⁰ Move and rapid countermove centered around the sugar quota, the refinement of Russian crude oil in American-owned refineries, and the final expropriation of these assets by the revolutionary government.

The drift of Cuba toward the communist political and economic orbit became a flight. Each loss realized by the reduction of United States investment, trade, aid, and influence was marked by an increase in communist bloc participation in Cuban affairs. Closer commercial and political relations with other communist nations included Yugoslavia, Poland, and East Germany.

The reliance of Cuba on communist countries was

²⁰Mezerik, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

originally for economic support, but the increasing tensions in the hemisphere, created by the animosity of the revolutionary government toward her American neighbors, particularly the United States, made the promise of military aid an important factor.²¹ The trend of events in the now year-and-a-half-old Cuban regime had sorely tempted the United States to intervene more decisively than with economic pressures. Castro repeatedly protested against what he called United States economic intervention to overthrow the Cuban Revolution, and his charges that armed attack was intended by the United States were heard in the United Nations as early as October 1959.²²

On July 9, 1960, Chairman Khrushchev promised military aid to Cuba in the event of an attack.²³ The United States fear that ever closer Cuba-USSR economic and military ties might result in a Soviet intrusion into the Western Hemisphere led President Eisenhower to re-emphasize the Monroe Doctrine, warning that the United States would never permit "the establishment of a regime dominated by international communism in the Western hemisphere."²⁴

²¹Ibid.., p. 12.

²²Ibid.., p. 13.

²³USSR Embassy Press Release, No. 330, 9 July 1960, Washington, D. C.

²⁴Facts on File, Vol. XV, No. 1028, 7-13 July 1960, New York.

Khrushchev replied, saying: "We consider that the Monroe Doctrine has outlived itself, has died, so to say, a natural death."²⁵

With this statement, the USSR espoused a policy of openly participating in Latin America; its military and economic help to Cuba increased rapidly. From this time on the United States, and with it the Organization of American States, chose to regard the Soviet Union as the main enemy and Cuba as its puppet.

This view was obvious in the policy declaration adopted by the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in San Jose, Costa Rica. "The Declaration of San Jose," issued on August 28, 1960, did not mention Cuba but concentrated on the USSR and Red China. It condemned "emphatically, intervention or the threat of intervention, even when conditional, from an extra-continental power in the affairs of the American Republics" It also rejected:

. . . the attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers to make use of the political, economic or social situation of any American State, inasmuch as that attempt is capable of destroying hemispheric unity and jeopardizing the peace and security of the hemisphere.²⁶

²⁵ New York Times, July 13, 1960.

²⁶ Text of the Declaration of San Jose quoted in Mezerik, op. cit., Vol. I, Appendix C, p. 47.

By September 2, Cuba was the first American State to recognize the People's Republic of China. Soon afterwards, the United States Department of State issued a report citing "quantities of arms" being delivered from the Soviet bloc, which included some seventy rocket launchers, MIG fighters, and automatic rifles and sub-machine guns.²⁷

On December 31, Cuba asked for an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider evidence that the United States planned an invasion of Cuba within a few hours, on what Castro said was the fraudulent pretext that Russia was building rocket launching sites there.²⁸ Following an ultimatum that the United States cut its diplomatic corps in Havana to eleven persons within forty-eight hours because of its involvement in "criminal espionage and subversion," President Eisenhower broke diplomatic relations on January 3, 1961.²⁹

The break in U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations was followed in April by the U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion. This event, in which the United States admitted its complicity, opened up a debate in the United States and

²⁷ New York Times, November 19, 1960.

²⁸ Mezerik, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 65.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 65.

resulted in a split international reaction. In Washington, the leadership of the CIA was changed and a number of investigations ensued. The Administration was charged with the failure of the Cuban Brigade. Many United States allies and those nations in Latin America favoring the idea of invasion supported this point of view. Criticism was especially sharp from Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which had hosted the CIA training camps. On the other hand, sympathy for Cuba and satisfaction with its victory was also widespread. The communist countries all condemned the United States role. Castro sympathizers demonstrated in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Uruguay, and even the United States.³⁰

Cuba had made its case against the United States in a series of meetings before, during, and after the invasion. The United States, and with it almost all its allies, wanted little United Nations action, preferring--as throughout the history of the Castro question--to deal entirely through the OAS, where the African, Asian, and communist countries do not participate. After debating for eleven sessions, the General Assembly adopted an inconclusive resolution which effectively left the United States to

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

work out action through the OAS.³¹ At this juncture, the United States vigorously renewed her policy of attempting to isolate Cuba from the inter-American system. The first step after the failure of the invasion came when the Inter-American Defense Board of the OAS, meeting in Washington April 26, 1961, voted to bar Cuba from its secret sessions on hemispheric defense. The United States had urged the measure, saying it was necessary in the light of Cuba's "evident military alliance with the Soviet bloc."³²

This policy was further enunciated on August 5, in a statement to Congress by Secretary of State Rusk:

It will be necessary as a first step to ensure that Castro-type Revolution is insulated from neighboring countries in the Caribbean . . . the US is consulting with other Latin American Governments on this.³³

Meanwhile Soviet supplies of armaments to Cuba were an obvious fact. The profession of communist faith was explicit in Castro's December 2, 1961, speech:

I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be one until the day I die There is no half way between socialism and imperialism.

He concluded that the Cuban revolution was following "the

³¹United Nations Document A/Res/1616 (XV) (New York, April 1961).

³²Facts on File, 1961, Vol. XXI, No. 1070, April 27-May 3, 1961, New York.

³³Mezerik, op. cit., Vol. II, excerpt quoted on p. 19.

only honest road, the road of a Socialist and anti-imperialist revolution."³⁴

Two days later, on December 4, the Council of the Organization of American States met and adopted a resolution to convene a Foreign Ministers meeting. The increased attention being given by the other American States to Cuba's snow-balling association with the Sino-Soviet bloc led Premier Castro to reassure his Latin American neighbors on January 2, 1962:

Our weapons are not offensive weapons and are not suitable for waging an offensive war Our weapons are defensive weapons . . . /they/ will never prejudice the security of any people.³⁵

This reassurance was not convincing, however, and the Inter-American Peace Committee of the OAS reported on January 14, 1962:

The present connections of the Government of Cuba with the Sino-Soviet bloc of countries are evidently incompatible with the principles and standards that govern the regional system, and particularly with the collective security established by the Charter of the OAS and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.³⁶

³⁴Quoted in New York Times, December 3, 1961.

³⁵Letter from the Cuban Representative to President of General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C 1/1866, New York, 1962.

³⁶Pan American Union, Organization of American States, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, del Este, Uruguay, 1962, Acts and Documents 1-76 (Washington, D.C., 1962), OEA/Ser. F/11.8, Doc. 5, p. 79.

CHAPTER III

MEETING THE THREAT TO HEMISPHERE SOLIDARITY

In spite of a disparity of views about the degree of urgency of the threat to hemisphere solidarity, Communism had been the target of a series of declarations and resolutions by the Organization of American States which recognized its nature and purpose. By 1959, these had become a part of the inter-American system's defenses against an external threat to break that solidarity.

With the defection of Castro to Communism, the reaction was mixed. The external threat had turned to an internal one. Castroism was not a clearly defined aggression, but confused with the issues of sovereign rights to self-determination, nationalism, and the revolution of new expectations. Thus, enmeshed with principles dear to the hearts of the Latin American leaders and peoples, a division of consensus was bound to occur about both the true nature of the threat and the action most appropriate to meet it.

I. THE EVOLUTION OF ANTI-COMMUNIST DECLARATIONS

Professor Mecham asks if the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was aimed at the Soviet

Union?¹ If the viewpoint is merely that of its antecedent, the Act of Chapultepec, which originally proposed the treaty in 1945 while Communist Russia was an ally, a negative answer ~~must~~ be given. A positive answer is as much in order, however, if one considers that the negotiation of a security agreement against aggression from any source was the problem at hand. The bitter disappointment and deep concern of the post-war era stemmed from the Soviet Union's power politics, opportunism, and ideological expansionism. The Rio Treaty undoubtedly had the support of states which had this threat in mind. As surely a factor, in the minds of most Latin Americans, was the prospect of acceptance by the United States of a later and more binding pledge to honor the inviolability of the twenty smaller and weaker neighbors with whom it shared the hemisphere.

The Ninth Inter-American Conference at Bogota, March 1948, was made acutely aware, if not really convinced, of the Communist danger and of the need for collective defense. The alleged communist involvement in the tragic riots, which took place while the conference met, contributed to the unanimous approval of the anti-communist

¹J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security 1889-1960 (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1962).

resolutions entitled "The Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America."²

This resolution declared that by its anti-democratic nature and its interventionist tendency, the political activity of international communism, or any other totalitarian doctrine, is incompatible with the concept of American freedom. It condemned every system suppressing political and civil liberties, and particularly international communism, suggesting that governments exchange information concerning the latter's activities and measures for controlling them.

With the advent of the Korean War, the American attitude of continental solidarity was reaffirmed and reinforced by a solid sense of responsibility to both regionalism and the world United Nations organization.³ Latin America was in hearty agreement with United Nations action to brand China an aggressor in Korea and to embargo strategic materials.⁴

²Pan American Union, Organization of American States, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, del Este, Uruguay, 1962, Acts and Documents 1-76 (Washington, D.C., 1962), OEA/Ser. F/II.8, Doc. 2, pp. 24ff. Hereinafter cited as OEA/Ser. F/II.8, Doc. ____.

³Mecham, op. cit., pp. 429-432.

⁴John A. Houston, Latin America in the United Nations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956), pp. 120-128.

Because the aggressive policy of international communism carried out through a Soviet satellite had brought about an emergency situation which was a threat to the entire free world, the United States requested the convocation of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation where efforts were coordinated to meet it by common effort. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meeting in Washington, 1951, came together to discuss political and military cooperation for the defense of the Americas, cooperation to strengthen internal security, and emergency economic cooperation.

The most important action taken was a resolution by the American republics to remain steadfastly united in the face of a threat to any one of them, and to close ranks in the common interest of providing internal security against the subversive action of international communism by strengthening basic democratic institutions. An important corollary to this declaration was asserted to be the advancement of the social and economic well-being of the people.⁵ Professor Mecham has written that the principal contribution of the meeting was the demonstration of moral solidarity among the American nations on the ideological issue of Communism.⁶ Consensus on the solidarity of the

⁵OEA/Ser.F/11.8, Doc. 2, pp. 26-27.

⁶Mecham, op. cit., p. 435.

Americas threatened by extra-continental Communism never seemed so high. A year later, the impact of a communist regime within the hemisphere was to fracture that apparent solidarity, however, and to make intensely real a situation which Latin American opinion had heretofore given an almost cavalier treatment. That is to say, until the threat actually came to the hemisphere in the form of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, the resistance to a threat from without was idealistically met with declarations. None of the knotty problems of internal hemisphere security with their connotations of intervention for the common defense in the affairs of a sister republic had as yet been faced.

The spectacular success of international communism in establishing its ascendancy over the Guatemalan government in 1952 was presumably shocking and sobering to a large number of Latin Americans. Such success in the hemisphere, many thought, seemed bound to extend Soviet political influence to this continent and greatly endanger its solidarity; it was in bold defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States saw, understood, and sought action to prevent this contravention of "American" principles. The Latin Americans saw and understood the situation in quite another context: that of intervention in the affairs of a sister republic to combat the communist threat. The cure

was more to be feared than the disease, they were inclined to believe.

The United States, however, had foresworn unilateral intervention as it had been practiced in the old days. High-handed unilateral action had been voluntarily abnegated in favor of the broader interest of the American community and the collective techniques for acting in that interest. Ambassador John C. Dreier, United States representative to the Organization of American States for a number of years, writes: "Over the years, this country has gradually relinquished to the organized community of the Western Hemisphere an increasing share of its capacity for decision and action."⁷ There remained the test of collective action in a situation which neither the Rio Treaty nor any other pact seemed to fit precisely. Thus, bound to collective intervention, if intervention there was to be, the United States was brought to exert great diplomatic pressure upon her smaller neighbors. What was obtained was a resolution of solidarity against Communism but no prescription for collective intervention.

In Chapter II, we have already discussed the opposition and resentment encountered by the United States in

⁷John C. Dreier, The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 8.

... of the
...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

obtaining the resolution it got at Caracas. Suffice it here to say that a crack in the armor of solidarity was apparent at that conference. It began to appear that the principle of non-intervention, as interpreted by Argentina and Mexico, who abstained from voting at Caracas, was dearer to them than American solidarity.⁸ This appearance was considerably heightened in the aftermath of the Guatemalan affair. Although there was little disposition to take note of the issue of international communist intervention, the allegation that the powerful United States maneuvered the overthrow of the government of little Guatemala became an apparent reality to many Latin Americans who seized on it to stir up a veritable hornets' nest of criticism against their powerful neighbor. Here, indeed, was an illustration of the Latin's concern over intervention--a concern outweighing any possible realization or fear of communist aggression.⁹

As the absence of United States intervention became known and the truth of the charges of communism against the Arbenz regime were verified, this criticism of the United States abated. According to Professor Mecham, this rise and turn of events tended to prove the great disinterest

⁸Mecham, op. cit., p. 443.

⁹Ibid., p. 451.

and lack of information on the subject of the communist threat which the Latins possessed.¹⁰

Despite the heightened communist activities in Latin America following the Guatemalan affair, Communists are not numerous in these states.¹¹ The danger of communism lies in the intentions and the methods employed by a monolithic controlled and oriented organization which successfully infiltrates intellectual circles, student groups, labor and public-opinion media, exploiting the Latin's latent anti-Yankee attitudes. It is subservient to a control external to the Western Hemisphere. It seeks the subversion of all non-communist society. It has adopted the practice of deceit in leaguering itself with the non-communist left and catering to the legitimate aspirations of underdeveloped peoples.¹²

The communist success in winning control of the Cuban revolution and Castro's subsequent attempts to infiltrate into other Latin American states was to put an unmatched strain on the practice as well as the concept of American solidarity.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 452.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 453-454.

¹² Pan American Union, Special Consultative Committee on Security against the Subversive Action of Internal Local Communism, Initial General Report 1962 (Washington, D.C., 1962), pp. 4ff.

II. REACTION TO CASTRO IN THE HEMISPHERE

Fidel Castro's overthrow of Fulgencio Batista's harsh dictatorship had been hailed with delight by most Latin Americans. Castro became the idol of the underprivileged masses who longed for fundamental social and economic reforms. The excesses of revolutionary reprisal, the wholesale expropriation of private property, the suppression of civil rights, and the postponement of constitutional government only partially dimmed the popular predilection for the charismatic leader.¹³ Castro represented for a time a revolution which the down-trodden masses of the American peoples wanted very much to believe in; he was the Savior of their misery and their hope of a promising future; he rode the crest of a wave which they hoped would presage a tide upon which would rise the redress of their grievances against the status quo. He was the symbol of a movement of workers and peasants who were breaking the shackles of serfdom and leading a new nationalistic crusade against dictatorships supported by alien capitalist imperialists.¹⁴

¹³ Macham, op. cit., p. 455; also Boris Goldenberg, "The Cuban Revolution: An Analysis," Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.: United States Information Agency, Vol. XII, No. 5, Sept.-Oct., 1963). This article deals with the nature and transformation of the Cuban revolution.

¹⁴ Macham, op. cit., p. 455.

The excesses of Castro's hate campaign against the United States, the developing ideological differences with such leading liberals as José Figueres and Rómulo Betancourt, and his calculated undermining of inter-American solidarity caused the patience of the Latin Americans to grow thin.¹⁵ The result was an increase in tensions in the Caribbean, with repercussions in the rest of the hemisphere which posed a major threat to the inter-American system. In response to this threat, the Organization of American States took a series of actions to relieve tensions; to condemn aggression and intervention in the affairs of the American states; and to promote intensified inter-American cooperation for the improvement of social and economic conditions in Latin America.

A principal "bad actor" in the Caribbean appeared to be the Castro government of Cuba. In April 1959, Panama claimed it had been invaded by foreign elements sailing from Cuba. The Representative of Panama on the Council of the OAS "demanded" the immediate convocation of the Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.¹⁶ The Council, acting provisionally as the Organ

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 456.

¹⁶ Department of State, Inter-American Efforts to Relieve International Tensions in the Western Hemisphere 1959-1960 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

of Consultation, appointed a committee composed of representatives of Brazil, the United States, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Paraguay which verified that the invaders had come from Cuba.¹⁷ In July, the Dominican Republic alleged that Cuba was a base from which invaders had embarked to land in Dominican territory and requested Council consideration of the issue.¹⁸ In the course of the OAS Council's discussion of the Dominican request, the Representative of Haiti proposed orally that a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs be convoked on the basis of Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the OAS¹⁹ to consider the general situation in the Caribbean area as a problem of an urgent nature and of common interest to the American States.²⁰ Specifically, Haiti alleged an invasion of her territory by a group coming from Cuba.²¹

July 1962), Department of State Publication 7409, pp. 6-7. Cited hereinafter as Western Hemisphere Tensions.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 17-18.

¹⁹OAS Charter, Article 39 provides for consultation on problems of an urgent nature and of common interest; Article 40 provides that an absolute majority of the OAS Council may decide to hold such a meeting.

²⁰Western Hemisphere Tensions, op. cit., p. 18.

²¹Northwestern University, United States-Latin American Relations, The Organization of American States, a study prepared by Professors George Blanksten, Harold Guetzkow and John Plank for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 28.

The United States became the diplomatic mediator in the OAS of various nationalistic face-saving disputes among the Dominicans, Cubans, Venezuelans, and Haitians--disputes which dealt generally with the impact of the revolutionary movement currently exemplified by Castro. Speaking in the OAS Council, Ambassador John C. Dreier of the United States observed that the situation in the Caribbean involved other matters than the various national cases presented and suggested that a general deterioration of the situation should be reviewed and that the OAS should examine the causes thereof and take action to revitalize the basic principles of hemispheric solidarity.²²

The membership of the Council agreed to convoke the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Santiago, Chile, on August 12, 1959. Unlike the preceding four meetings in the series, this consultation was not primarily concerned with extra-hemispheric pressures as the previous war-time meetings had been, but with meeting disturbing symptoms that had appeared inside the hemisphere itself. President Jorge Alessandri of Chile, in his welcoming address at Santiago, declared that the foundations of our American institutions were hanging in balance--that not in the Caribbean alone, but anywhere

²²Ibid., pp. 19-20.

in the Americas, the basic problem of maintaining solidarity might arise.²³ The Santiago meeting marked a change in the complexion of inter-American consultations, in the sense that the problems to be discussed were, indeed, very close to home and involved hemisphere neighbors rather than protagonists strictly alien.

Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, in an address in the Second Plenary Session on August 13, called the principle of non-intervention the most important foundation stone of relationships in the inter-American system. Among the delegates, there was a unanimous opinion that measures should be avoided which might weaken this basic pillar of solidarity. On the other hand, general agreement existed also on the necessity for strengthening peace and alleviating tensions by measures adequate to meet new and changing circumstances. He urged that steps be taken in such a way as to strengthen respect for representative democracy and human rights. Notwithstanding their belief in non-intervention, some of the Foreign Ministers expressed the view that the principle needed to be adjusted and harmonized with the democracy and human rights principles also basic to the solidarity of the Americas.²⁴ The dilemma confronting the meeting

²³Ibid., p. 24.

²⁴Ibid., p. 28.

was how to preserve non-intervention as the guarantee of the sovereignty and independence of the American states yet, at the same time, adopt practical measures to effect the goals of democracy and respect for human rights in the hemisphere.

The Foreign Ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay presented arguments that reflected serious consideration of the dilemma, but in each case took the position that non-intervention must not be compromised in the slightest degree.²⁵ A reconciliation of measures to promote democracy and human rights with the principle of non-intervention was never achieved. Rather, the former were reaffirmed in Resolutions III, VIII, IX, and X adopted by the meeting, but remained subordinate to the supreme principle of non-intervention, which was also reasserted by Resolutions II, V, and VII.²⁶ Increased economic development was the technique recommended to further human rights and democracy. By this approach, more direct intervention was avoided. Cuba, Brazil, and Bolivia made strong appeals for increased Pan American economic cooperation, and they were merely the outstanding voices in a chorus which repeated the refrain, citing

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 29-30.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 35-41.

economic underdevelopment as the obstacle to all aspirations. The meeting adopted a resolution which urged member states to speed implementation of economic development measures already undertaken.²⁷

Despite the resolutions adopted at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation, events were to aggravate rather than lessen international tensions in the Caribbean affecting American solidarity. The Dominican Government engaged in virulent subversive and propaganda activities against Venezuela--activities which led to the Convocation of a Sixth Meeting of Consultation at San José, Costa Rica, in August 1960.²⁸ In the same month, a separate and distinct Seventh Meeting followed at the same site, to consider the deterioration of United States-Cuban relations.

The attitude of the governments of Cuba and the United States had become mutually hostile and even provocative toward one another. A series of confiscatory actions against United States trade and investment in Cuba was coupled with the engagement of Cuban diplomatic officials and agents in interventionist activity to promote revolution against existing governments in other Latin American states. The United States cut Cuba's sugar quota. Of transcendent importance was the progressive reorientation

²⁷Ibid., p. 41.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 65-70.

The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of the
 properties of the \mathcal{H}_∞ norm for the class of systems
 considered in this paper. In particular, we show that
 the \mathcal{H}_∞ norm is a monotone increasing function of the
 order of the system. This property is useful in the
 design of controllers for systems with uncertain order.
 In the second part of the paper, we consider the problem
 of robust control for systems with uncertain order.
 We show that the \mathcal{H}_∞ norm is a useful tool for
 the design of robust controllers. In particular, we
 show that the \mathcal{H}_∞ norm is a monotone increasing
 function of the order of the system. This property
 is useful in the design of controllers for systems
 with uncertain order. In the third part of the paper,
 we consider the problem of robust control for systems
 with uncertain order. We show that the \mathcal{H}_∞ norm
 is a useful tool for the design of robust controllers.
 In particular, we show that the \mathcal{H}_∞ norm is a
 monotone increasing function of the order of the
 system. This property is useful in the design of
 controllers for systems with uncertain order.

of the Castro Government toward the Sino-Soviet bloc and the threat of Soviet military intervention made by Chairman Nikita Khrushchev in a Moscow speech on July 9, 1960. A general concern over this latter fact was expressed in a note of July 13 to the Council of the OAS by the Representative of Peru. It requested the convocation of a Meeting of Consultation for the purpose of considering the exigencies of hemisphere solidarity, the defense of the regional system, and the defense of American democratic principles in the face of threats that might affect them.²⁹

In session to consider the request, the Council of the OAS heard Peruvian Ambassador Juan Bautista de Lavalley declare:

. . . we are witnessing the development of a plan for subverting the republican institutions of America . . . for instigating disorder and instability in its internal political life, and for disturbing by means of propaganda, pressure, or threats the right of peoples to govern themselves.³⁰

On July 29, the Council approved the recommendations of a preparatory committee that the meeting be held at San José. In a three-day debate on the issues all the Latin American countries, with the exception of Cuba, unanimously condemned any attempt by the Sino-Soviet powers to

²⁹Ibid., p. 221.

³⁰Ibid., quoted on p. 222. Department of State translation.

intervene in the affairs of the hemisphere. They generally agreed that such an attempt could only be intended to implant the alien Communist political system and ideology in the Americas and, therefore, posed a great threat to the inter-American system and its individual members.³¹

With respect to Cuba, however, opinions differed as to the extent of that country's involvement in Soviet designs and the degree to which it constituted a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere. Furthermore, most of the countries expressed the greatest concern over the threat to hemisphere solidarity resulting from the controversy between Cuba and the United States. In the opening debate, Peruvian Foreign Minister Raúl Farras Barrenechea, in explaining the spirit of absolute neutrality and conciliation in which his government had requested the meeting, declared that Peru deplored the worsening tensions between Cuba and the United States, the reprisals adopted by one side or the other, and their aggravation by the intervention of Chairman Khrushchev. He declared that he could not conceive, however, of Cuba becoming the satellite of any power and expressed confidence that the Cuban revolution would not be diverted from its original course nor from its American destiny.³²

³¹Ibid., p. 72.

³²Ibid., pp. 295-297. Department of State translation.

Mexico advised patience with the Cuban revolution and rejected any collective action endangering the principle of non-intervention.³³ Venezuela criticized the United States for past actions taken against Cuba and attributed them to the influence of "an intense propaganda campaign encouraged by covert interests."³⁴ It also criticized Cuba for its immoderate attacks on the United States. Venezuela supported a Colombian proposal for the establishment of a committee to lend good offices in the dispute and believed that the meeting should condemn all forms of intervention, ratify the principle of self-determination of peoples, and approve the unquestioned right of Cuba to develop freely its own revolution.³⁵

Somewhat out of context, the Brazilian representative asserted that he regarded the economic underdevelopment of Latin America as the basic and underlying threat to the political solidarity of the hemisphere and proposed that the Council of the OAS draw up a draft supplementary protocol to the Rio Treaty concerning economic cooperation

³³ Ibid., p. 72.

³⁴ Ibid., quoted on p. 74. Department of State translation.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 331-336. Department of State translation. OAS Official Records, OEA/Ser.V/II.7 (Spanish), Doc. 59, August 25, 1960, pp. 2-7.

for submission to the ~~the~~ incoming Eleventh Inter-American Conference.³⁶

These several views indicate the nature of difference between United States and Latin American assessments of the situation and the action which it seemed to indicate as necessary to the various states of the hemisphere. For the United States, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter expressed the conviction that the meeting should rigorously condemn Soviet intervention and indicate its grave concern over Cuba's toleration and encouragement of such intervention. He urged the Conference to call for effective resistance to interventionist efforts by the Sino-Soviet bloc in America.³⁷

Notwithstanding this diversity of views expressed in the general debates, the Declaration of San José condemned the intervention by an extra-continental power in the affairs of any American republic. The resolution was adopted unanimously by nineteen countries (Cuba and the Dominican Republic being absent). It did not mention Cuba by name anywhere in its text. In explaining their votes in favor of the Declaration, the Venezuelan, Mexican,

³⁶Ibid., pp. 298-304. Department of State translation of OEA/Ser.F/11.7 (Spanish), Doc. 16, August 23, 1960, pp. 3-11.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 315-325.

and Bolivian Foreign Ministers stressed that the resolution was not to be considered hostile to, or condemnatory of, Cuba. The governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua, however, stated that they would have preferred a stronger stand against the menace of international communist intervention through Cuba.³⁸ This Conference marks a significant dichotomy of views which was to intensify in the future.

But the reaction to Castro and Communism in the hemisphere was not confined entirely to anti-communist declarations. As has been noted, the recurring theme of economic development was seen as a positive method for ultimately denying a victory of revolutionary change to the Communists. Therefore, the adoption by the Act of Bogota of a program of social and economic progress was another form of reaction to the threats imperiling American solidarity.³⁹ Adopted at that third meeting of the Committee of twenty-one, held at Bogota, Colombia, September 5-13, 1960, this Act took steps to implement economic programs to improve conditions for the mass of peoples of Latin America and to fulfill a promise of a better life for them. Of greater significance, and of more far-reaching

³⁸Ibid., p. 85.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 90-103.

intent, was the Alliance for Progress inaugurated at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August 1961.

III. A HEMISPHERE DIVIDED ON REMEDIAL ACTION

A proliferation of declarations against Communism and for the implementation of long-term economic programs were insufficient to reverse a trend which seemed destined to render permanent a cleavage of the historic solidarity of the Americas. Hence, vigorous and immediate remedial action was seen by many American states as imperative if solidarity was to be restored. The United States was foremost among this faction. A distinctly reticent faction, however, tended to divide opinion on what remedies, if any, were appropriate. The law and politics of the inter-American system were to show the extent to which diversity still existed in the presence of an effort at unified action.

The Colombian delegation presented a note to the Council of the Organization of American States, on November 14, 1961, calling for a Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Its proposal was made under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty "in order to consider threats to the peace and to the political independence of the American states that might arise from the intervention of extra-continental powers seeking to break inter-American

solidarity." The note went on to say that the meeting requested should:

Point out the various types of threats to the peace or certain acts that, if they occur, justify the application of measures for the maintenance of the peace and security, pursuant to Chapter V of the Charter of the Organization of American States and the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.⁴⁰

The Rio Treaty makes provisions for action to counter aggression of two kinds: armed attack; and acts, facts, or situations that do not constitute an armed attack but constitute a threat to peace. There are certain antecedents which should be reviewed here to establish the background of legality of the meeting requested by Colombia.

Presently, inter-American solidarity and its protection by a system of collective security stems from certain principles and procedures that the American republics agreed upon at Buenos Aires in 1936, where it was declared that "every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them, and justifies" consultation.⁴¹ Two years later, at Lima in 1938, this declaration was repeated and consultation made an obligation. At Havana, in 1940, the Consultation of

⁴⁰OEA/Ser. F/11.8, Doc. 3.

⁴¹OEA/Ser. F/11.8, Doc. 2, p. 4.

Ministers extended the principle of solidarity to "any attempt on the part of a non-American State" against the integrity of the territory or political independence of an American State, declaring that such an attempt "shall be considered an act of aggression" against all the States signing the declaration.⁴²

The Treaty of Rio, 1947, made official and formal the foregoing principles and incorporated in treaty form the methods and procedures of the collective security system adopted on a war-time basis at Mexico City in 1945. The preamble of the former considered again not only "acts of aggression" but also "threats of aggression" against any State, by any State, American or extra-continental. Remedies included breaking of relations; interrupting economic, commercial, and financial relations; and the use of armed force to repel or prevent aggression. It should be noted that in Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and Article 25 of the Charter of the OAS, acts and facts or situations that do not constitute an armed attack are foreseen and the Organ of Consultation is strengthened with competence to define them and to affect measures to meet them. These include acts, facts or circumstances affecting human

⁴²Ibid.

rights, democracy, and other aspects of the 'political defense of the Hemisphere.'"⁴³

The Meeting of Consultation requested by Colombia would be competent to consider those acts, facts or situations that presently constituted "threats" originating from the intervention of international communism in America. Ample precedent had been established during the Second World War and following it, by the convocations of Consultation which considered and defined certain acts, facts or situations of the same kind as those contemplated by the convocation requested. The "aggressive nature" of communism had already been declared an "intervention in the affairs of the Americas" at Caracas in 1954 and the Punta del Este meeting was to determine the measures advisable to take for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

Article 6 of the Rio Treaty dealt with the second type of aggression, and this was the article to be invoked against Cuba. In view of the juridical arguments to be raised in the Council considering the Colombian note, it bears citing in full:

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political

⁴³ Pan American Union, Report of the Rapporteur of the Second Committee of the Rio Conference, Doc. CMJ/130, CII/24, 30 August 1947, Washington, D.C.

independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.⁴⁴

In the discussions of the Council as to whether a Meeting of Consultation should be called, the Representative of Mexico argued that the interpretation his government placed upon the terms of the Treaty required that there be not only a "threat to the peace" but a "threat to the peace that affects the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence" of an American state. The Mexican Government's representative further opined that the element of "urgency" required by the Rio Treaty was lacking. He argued, furthermore, that the Colombian note made no reference to any fact that would bring the situation clearly within the restrictive nature of Article 6 (i.e., presumably something affecting the inviolability or the integrity of the

⁴⁴Department of State, Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security, Publication No. 3016, International Conference Series II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948).

territory, so that the convocation of a consultative meeting was tantamount to an extension of the Treaty).⁴⁵

Mexico was not alone. The Chilean delegate contributed a further point to the Mexican argument. Colombia, he observed, had asked for a Meeting of Consultation "to consider the threats to the peace . . . that might arise" and to decide what should be done "if they occur." This, he submitted, only served to stress that no such threat had occurred, as yet; and since the Treaty authorized a meeting only when the situation existed, there was no legal basis for calling a meeting.⁴⁶

Thomas and Thomas are of the opinion that the word might renders "Article 6 most extensive, so that it covers present and actual as well as possible situations that might threaten the peace." They confess that the use of the word might in the Colombian note was unfortunate and obtuse in a desire to incur less argument among the Council membership, but conclude that the terminology of Article 6 is broad enough to cover the situation to which it was directed. As for the Mexican argument, they contend that it had little legal merit.⁴⁷

⁴⁵OEA/Ser. G/II/C-2-427; OEA/Ser. P/II.8, Doc. 25 (Spanish), pp. 83-89.

⁴⁶OEA/Ser. G/II/C-2-427, pp. 34ff.

⁴⁷A. J. Thomas and Ann V. Thomas, The Organization

C. Neale Ronning, pointing out that the reference in Article 6 to "any act or situation that might endanger the peace," would support two different interpretations in Spanish and Portuguese by their differing uses of the present subjunctive. He believes that even a French version does not provide the definitive interpretation one hopes for in the language of diplomacy.⁴⁸

A Background Memorandum on the Convocation of the meeting was prepared by the Department of Legal Affairs of the Pan American Union, hoping, apparently, to resolve the legal doubts before the opening of the Meeting of Consultation. It argued that by precedent and the intent of the drafters, the Rio Treaty should extend in application to the situation under discussion.⁴⁹

Most of the delegates seemed to ignore the actual wording of the Colombian note and argued that the threats outlined in Article 6 actually did exist.⁵⁰ The United States delegate, Ambassador de Lesseps S. Morrison,

of American States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), p. 325.

⁴⁸ C. Neale Ronning, Punta del Este: The Limits of Collective Security in a Troubled Hemisphere (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1963), p. 8.

⁴⁹ OEA/Ser. F/11.8, Doc. 2.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

insisted that a situation not only might but actually does exist which endangers the peace of America; a flagrant subversion does involve danger to the political independence of the American states.⁵¹ Under the circumstances, it would seem to have been preferable to adjust the wording of the Draft Resolution to state clearly that the purpose for calling the meeting was to consider a situation that actually did endanger the peace. As it stood, the Draft Resolution of the Council, then under consideration, repeated the same wording used in the Colombian note, and the arguments made during its discussion were quite out of context with the reasons stated for calling the meeting in the first place.

Former Ambassador John C. Dreier stated, in a lecture at The American University in the fall of 1963, that one or two governments that were willing to go along with the verbally expressed, but usually unpublicized, reasons for calling the meeting, preferred to leave the Resolution, which would be published, in the weaker form. Professor Ronning confirms this reason for not changing the wording of the Resolution, on the basis of suggestions made to him by a number of Latin Americans that a change might have

⁵¹OEA/Ser. G/II/C-2-427, p. 26.

jeopardized the chances of obtaining the two-thirds vote necessary for adoption.⁵²

Thus, having suffered through the various legal arguments--a formality which surprised very few and was convincing to no one--the Council members cast their votes. Cuba and Mexico voted against convoking the meeting. Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador abstained from voting. The remaining fourteen--a necessary two-thirds--voted in favor.⁵³ This lack of solidarity which prevailed at the Council meeting was a harbinger of a similar disunity that was to prevail at the meeting of Consultation to convene at Punta del Este, Uruguay.

⁵²Monning, op. cit., p. 9.

⁵³Department of State Bulletin (December 25, 1961), pp. 1059-1071. (See New York Times, January 26, 28, 31, February 1, 4, 16, 16, 1962).

CHAPTER IV

THE INTER-AMERICAN RESPONSE AT PUNTA DEL ESTE

A note of urgency appeared in the remarks of Uruguayan Foreign Minister Romero Martinez Montero as he welcomed the American Ministers to Punta del Este on January 22, 1962. In his opening address, he said:

This whole system seems to be going into crisis. Impartial and calm examination of the situation leads to the conclusion that, in spite of noble aspirations and a multitude of wellfounded declarations . . . today, as never before . . . its members are aware that the united destiny of the hemisphere has deep fissures in it that threaten the strength of the organization.¹

The meeting had been called to deal with alleged threats to hemispheric peace, threats created by developments within Cuba. We have seen how the differing interpretations of the immediate antecedents and legal issues of the case divided the hemisphere and raised a serious question as to whether the Inter-American system would be able to meet the challenge. The meeting was prejudged by some as an historic one; by others, as foredoomed to insipidity in word and devoid of any action save that of

¹Pan American Union. Organization of American States, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Punta del Este, Uruguay, 1962, Acts and Documents, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962).

demonstrating the weakening condition of the inter-American system. Subsequent events have only partially proved the accuracy of either prognosis but have demonstrated the mutual compatibility of both.²

Since a large and important bloc of Latin American countries abstained from voting in the Council on the Resolution to convene the meeting, it is perhaps surprising that it was decided to have a meeting at all. These five nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador) represented more than half of the Latin population.³ Some observers believed that the United States should have waited until more time could be devoted to winning the approval of at least one of these states. A large number of meetings between President Frondizi of Argentina and the Kennedy Administration suggest that a special effort was made to win over this nation.⁴ The military in Argentina had especially adamant anti-Castro sentiments, for example;⁵ and the United States, having knowledge of

OEA/Ser.F/11.8, Doc. 10, p. 2. Hereinafter cited as OEA/Ser.F/11.8, Doc. ____.

²G. Connell-Smith, "The Future of the OAS," The World Today, Vol. 18, No. 3 (March, 1962), p. 112.

³U. S. Congress, Senate, Record of the 87th Congress, Second Session (2 February 1962), p. 1391.

⁴Connell-Smith, op. cit., pp. 117-118.

⁵C. Neale Ronning, Punta del Este: The Limits of

this attitude, had apparently entertained some hope of that country's support at Punta del Este.⁶

The existence of two blocs among the assembled delegations became the chief item of news and also of concern as soon as the Foreign Ministers assembled on 22 January 1962. One bloc favored sanctions against the government of Cuba. This group included the United States, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Peru, and the Central American countries. The others generally opposed sanctions. This bloc included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico. In the case of at least two republics, Haiti and Uruguay, there appeared to be no irrevocable alignment with either side. Both had voted for convening the meeting, but neither one had indicated clearly what its position would be.⁷

That two such blocs existed had, of course, been known since the OAS Council voted to call the meeting. But when the ministers finally assembled for their task, the hard fact of these two blocs and the possible consequences of the dichotomy became discouragingly apparent.

Collective Security in a Troubled Hemisphere (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1963), p. 14.

⁶Connell-Smith, op. cit., p. 118.

⁷Ronning, op. cit., p. 14.

Some members of the delegations opposing sanctions emphasized "privately" that they were prisoners of domestic political forces. In light of this fact, it was soon apparent that their positions could not be changed easily, in some cases, were not even open to compromise.⁸ There was little doubt as to the sympathy of the United States, however.

I. THE UNITED STATES POSITION

In the United States, the case against the Castro regime had been building for many months, and the position of that government was a secret to no one. It believed that the present situation in Cuba confronted the Western Hemisphere and the inter-American system with a grave and urgent challenge. This challenge did not result from the fact that the Castro government in Cuba was established by revolution, but that the revolutionary regime had betrayed its promise and delivered the revolution into the hands of powers alien to the hemisphere, perverting freedom and democracy into a mechanism for the destruction of free institutions. The seizure by international communism of a base and bridgehead in the Americas was a disruption of the inter-American system. The Department of State had

⁸Ibid.

stated the United States view:

It is the considered judgment of the Government of the United States of America that the Castro regime in Cuba offers a clear and present danger to the authentic and autonomous revolution of the Americas--to the whole hope of spreading political liberty, economic development, and social progress through all the republics of the hemisphere.⁹

This publication of views had been followed in the fall of 1961 with another U.S. State Department White Paper which was not dissimilar to that cited above. A brief document, it discussed the developments in the Cuban situation subsequent to the Sixth Meeting of Consultation held in August 1960, and was apparently presented to the Inter-American Peace Committee by way of evidence and assistance to that body.¹⁰

While the White Paper called for no action, it was clearly intended to prove the existence of a threat requiring the collective action of the American states. It reiterated two points which formed the basis of its whole case against Castro. First, it claimed that the Castro regime had established such extensive and intimate ties with the Sino-Soviet countries as to render Cuba an

⁹Department of State, Cuba (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 1961), Publication 7171, Inter-American Series 66, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰U.S. Department of State, The Castro Regime in Cuba (Washington, August 1961). (Mimeographed.)

appendage of the communist system. Second, it urged that Cuba must now be considered a Sino-Soviet beachhead in the hemisphere serving the objectives of international Communism.¹¹

The first point was well made, portraying an existing situation rather than arguing a particular course of action. The second point was most closely related to the charge made by Peru, which had set in motion the study of the Inter-American Peace Committee to be discussed later. The situation, described explicitly in the White Paper, fell within the scope of the Rio Treaty, as it dealt with the inviolability and territorial integrity of sovereign states.

The case was weak on two counts, however. First, the Department of State charged Castro with attempting to spread revolution by "example." But to say that a government is a threat to the peace simply by existing does not sound very convincing. The White Paper, therefore, referred to more concrete examples:

It [the Castro regime] is bringing hundreds of students, labor leaders, intellectuals and dissident political leaders to Cuba for indoctrination and training to be sent back to their countries for the double purpose of agitating in favor of the Castro regime and undermining establishment in other Latin American countries of so-called "Committees of

¹¹Ibid., pp. 1-3.

Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution' for the same dual purpose. Cuban diplomatic personnel encourage and finance agitation and subversion by dissident elements seeking to overthrow established governments by force.¹²

Professor Renning observes that these kinds of activities, while they may threaten the peace, least require collective action. Sovereign states threatened by the exchange of students, labor leaders, and intellectuals would have it in their power to take unilateral action. The use of diplomatic personnel for subversive purposes could be prevented by declaring them personae non gratae or by breaking diplomatic relations. Indeed, some governments most concerned about Castro's activities had already severed diplomatic ties before the time of the Punta del Este Meeting.¹³

Another document figured widely in preparing the case against Castro: The 14 January 1962 Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee. On November 27, 1961, Peru had requested an investigation by the committee, charging (1) that the Cuban Government had become incorporated into the Sino-Soviet bloc, (2) that it was guilty of infiltration and subversion in other American states, and (3) that it was denying certain fundamental human

¹²Ibid., p. 22.

¹³Renning, op. cit., p. 11.

rights to its citizens and to foreigners.¹⁴ An investigation was authorized and carried out by the committee. The publication of its report, just over a week before the conference opened, did not substantially strengthen the United States position.¹⁵ It contained much more evidence of ties between Cuba and the Communist bloc and violations of human rights than it did of the Castro regime's alleged subversive actions which could be termed aggression under the Rio Treaty.

On the first point, the report proved the existence of Cuban-Sino-Soviet ties by citing official Cuban declarations, Cuban votes in the United Nations, and the fact that Cuba had received military supplies from the Sino-Soviet bloc.¹⁶ The committee asserted that this identification with the Communist bloc was "antagonistic to the principles established in the Charter of the Organization of American States."¹⁷ As self-evident as this point may have been to the American governments, a vast segment of public opinion may have required more convincing evidence of the fact.

As for the subversive activities of the Cuban

¹⁴OEA/Ser.F/11.8, Doc. 3, p. 18.

¹⁵Connell-Smith, op. cit., p. 118.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 22ff.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 38.

government, the committee prefaced its findings with the following statement:

The Inter-American Peace Committee, for its part, does not have all the elements necessary for carrying out an exhaustive investigation in this field. Consequently, it has had to restrict itself to notoriously public facts and the reports that the governments of America have provided it.¹⁸

The evidence that followed was confined almost exclusively to instances where Cuban diplomatic agents had been expelled because of improper interventions in the domestic affairs of the countries to which they were accredited. The list included mostly countries whose diplomatic history showed such charges to be a commonplace occurrence.

In respect to the cases cited, the report concluded:

The cases enumerated, as well as others about which the Committee has not been able to gather complete information, or in which Cuban diplomatic officials left the countries to which they were accredited because of public accusations of intervention, reveal a situation that has caused many governments to consider the diplomatic missions of Cuba as centers of agitation and subversive propaganda.¹⁹

The committee concluded that such activities "would constitute acts that within the system for the 'political defense' of the Hemisphere, have been classed as acts of 'political aggression' or 'aggression of a non-military character.'"²⁰

¹⁸Ibid., p. 30.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 32.

²⁰Ibid., p. 40.

Professor Ronning is severe in his criticism of this portion of the committee's report, raising the question whether the finding to the effect that Cuba was guilty of "political aggression" was supported by the evidence. He rightly contends that there is more at stake here than the Cuban case. Present and future attitudes regarding the nature of the OAS are, indeed, also involved. He observes:

When nearly all evidence is prefaced by such statements as "many governments accuse" and "various governments have reported" and when a committee admits that it has been unable to carry out an "exhaustive investigation" and adds to this other cases "about which the Committee has not been able to gather complete information," it is not likely that the stature of the Organization will be enhanced as a result.²¹

It is not certain that a more careful investigation and report by the Peace Committee would have altered either the basis or the action of the American states Meeting on Consultation. But it is apparent that the report, as submitted, was not a strong factor in the case against Cuba.

The final action of the meeting was not predicated so much on "political aggression" or "causes of international tensions"--causes which are clearly within the scope of the Rio Treaty--as they were on Cuban-Sino-Soviet

²¹Ronning, op. cit., p. 13.

ties. "Incompatible" with and "antagonistic" to the regional principles expressed in the Charter were the premises upon which the Cuban case was forced within the scope of the Treaty.²² Secretary of State Dean Rusk had let it be known that the United States sought sanctions against the Cuban Government; but among all the countries of Latin America, only the Central American nations demanded strong action on the part of the Foreign Ministers.

II. THE ATTITUDE OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN STATES

The Central American demands were presented to the ministers in a joint resolution of the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.²³

The projected resolution charged:

The systematic intervention of the Cuban Government in the internal affairs of the American republic is seriously affecting their sovereignty and political independence, and a communist regime that serves the political interests of extra-continental powers and lends itself as an instrument of subversion in America has been implanted in the aforesaid island, all of which constitutes an imminent danger to the peace and security of the Hemisphere.²⁴

Accordingly, they requested a resolution which would label the Cuban situation as a danger to peace and security,

²²Ibid., pp. 13-14.

²³OEA/Ser.F/11.8, Doc. 45.

²⁴Ibid., p. 2.

requiring action under the Rio Treaty. The Central American states asked that, in conformity with the Treaty, it be resolved to (1) suspend the Government of Cuba from participating in the Organs of the OAS; (2) to rupture diplomatic and economic relations between member states and Cuba; (3) to empower the OAS Council to decide by two-thirds vote when Cuba would return to the inter-American system; and (4) to transmit the text of this resolution to the United Nations Security Council.²⁵

The opposition to the sanctions proposed by the Central Americans was formidable. Their Foreign Ministers insisted, however, that they would consider leaving the conference if there was no agreement on collective action against the Cuban regime; moreover, they informed Secretary Rusk that if the inter-American system proved unable to ensure adequate defensive measures against Cuba, they would ask the United States to conclude a Caribbean regional defense pact with them.²⁶

An Uruguayan observer at the Punta del Este Conference wrote of the Central American countries:

. . . they resolved to maintain themselves firm on the "hard line." There were no dissenters,

²⁵Ibid., pp. 3-5.

²⁶Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 21-28, April 1962, pp. 18 and 713.

all declaring themselves without equivocation for this policy.²⁷

The línea dura or "hard line" advocated was that the maximum sanctions possible be imposed on Cuba by the American states. This adamant position of the Central Americans seemed to make compromise very difficult.

A bloc of Latin republics opposed the extreme position of the Central Americans and were equally adamant in rejecting the imposition of sanctions. Before the general commission met on January 24, a compromise memorandum had been circulated by the Republics of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Haiti, and Mexico. It was of quite a different character from the Central American draft resolution which had followed it. The memorandum endorsed by this group of seven proposed that the conference should (1) formally denounce "the subversive activities of international Communism" and declare the incompatibility of Marxism-Leninism with the inter-American system; but, (2) it proposed that it should merely study the measures to be taken in view of this incompatibility, including the question of Cuban membership in the Inter-American Defense Board and the supply of arms to Cuba; and finally, (3) that it should consider the long-term

²⁷"G.V." El Día, Montevideo, 28 de Enero de 1962.
(This author's translation.)

question of "whether it will be necessary to revise the Charter" of the OAS to permit the suspension or expulsion of a member country. Declaring their belief that "the suggested procedure is adequate for reaching an agreement on an amply satisfactory basis," the seven republics stressed that "none of them will vote in favor of immediate or deferred application of any of the measures [sanctions] listed in Article 8 of the" Rio Treaty.²⁸ These two opposing views, supported by a bloc split, obviously denied the United States a required two-thirds majority in the OAS for its policy of sanction against Cuba and comprised a decided division in American solidarity. But even before the meeting, the United States Department of State had seen that a fall-back position was necessary and, giving up hope of a resolution calling for a break in diplomatic relations with Cuba, now searched for a compromise which would restore the rule of unanimity to inter-American meetings.

III. UNANIMITY VERSUS SANCTIONS

The task of the meeting became one of finding what common ground might exist for a compromise formula which would emphasize points of agreement and, at the same time,

²⁸Keesing's, op. cit., pp. 18 and 713.

minimize the degree of discord among the assembled delegations.

Since most of the negotiations and discussions took place behind closed doors, reliance was placed principally on the official acts and documents of the meetings. The statements made during the General Committee sessions provide relatively clear maximums of demand and possible concession at the meeting.

The delegation of Argentina was particularly active in finding some ground common to all delegations. The domestic political forces which made public pronouncement in favor of sanctions so dangerous for a number of governments has already been mentioned. Argentina, it will be recalled, was among these. The Frondizi government was faced with the pressures brought to bear by Argentina's armed forces who favored strong measures against Castro. On the other hand, important elections were only about a month away, and action against Castro could favor the growing opposition to Frondizi from Peronist and labor sources. Clearly, a compromise at Punta del Este was preferable for the incumbent regime in Argentina.²⁹ Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Canciano emphasized, with more force than any of his colleagues, the importance of

²⁹Ronning, op. cit., p. 17.

avoiding an open split in the OAS, expressing great concern over the danger of pushing the inter-American system beyond its limits.³⁰

The United States found it necessary to find a way to keep united those countries favoring sanctions and, at the same time, garner additional votes to fill out a two-thirds majority from among the less committed delegations. The Central American states had indicated that the least they would settle for was expulsion of Cuba from the OAS. A shift in the Argentine position always seemed possible and could affect the votes of Chile, Ecuador, or Bolivia.³¹

It was inevitable that the economic facet should figure in the Punta del Este Meeting, as it had in almost every previous inter-American conference. It was reasonable, too, to expect that at this meeting, where domestic political pressures were accorded repeated verbal deference, the United States might be obliged to point out some domestic political realities of its own.

The connection between United States economic power and United States political desires seemed inescapable. Barely six months earlier, at this very site, the Alliance for Progress had been launched as a policy for combating

³⁰OEA/Ser.F/11.8, Doc. 42 (espanol), p. 9.

³¹Ronning, op. cit., p. 18.

the communist bid to win the social and economic revolution in the hemisphere. Special White House Assistant to President John F. Kennedy, Richard Godwin, in statements to the press, had pointed out that the United States Congress had to vote funds for the Alliance and that it was also pressing for action against Cuba.³² The Latin American press was aware of this connection, and items of news and commentary illustrated their consideration of its significance.³³

The address to the conference by Secretary of State Dean Rusk referred immediately to the Alliance for Progress:

For the second time in six months, the nations of the Americas meet here in pursuit of their common goal--social progress and economic growth within a community of free and independent nations. But this time we come to take measures to safeguard that freedom and independence--so that in the future we may devote all our efforts to social progress and economic growth.³⁴

Secretary Rusk dwelled at length upon the plans of the Latin countries for houses, schools, factories, roads and dams; he said that the United States had already made large commitments for the present fiscal year and "will

³²Ibid., p. 18.

³³La Prensa (Buenos Aires), 23 January 1962; El Día (Montevideo) 24 January 1962; La Nación (Buenos Aires), 29 January 1962.

³⁴OEA/Ser.F/11.8, Doc. 35, p. 1.

have no difficulty in meeting the more than 1 billion dollars pledged for the first year of the Alliance for Progress."³⁵ Throughout his speech he stressed the Alliance and argued that it, not communism, symbolized the true wave of the future.

Milton Eisenhower has interpreted Secretary Rusk's speech in this way: "It was clear that the United States was tying its promise of economic aid to Latin America to the actions at Punta del Este."³⁶ Gordon Connell-Smith described the situation as one in which "United States prestige was at stake, for the conference was seen as a contest between the United States and Cuba; the Alliance for Progress versus Castroism."³⁷

Whatever the fact of the matter, the United States delegation knew beforehand that the hemisphere was split on the Cuban issue, that such unblushing pressure as was applied at Caracas in 1954 would not establish a necessary consensus, and that only the most subtle and restrained diplomacy would suffice in the face of the strong non-interventionist sentiments existent among the republics.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 2. (Italics this writer's.)

³⁶ Milton S. Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963), p. 325.

³⁷ Connell-Smith, op. cit., p. 118.

Secretary Rusk's speech was vigorous and pointed in its attack on Cuba and communism in the hemisphere, and explicit in the remedies called for against each. He dealt at length with the complexion of the Cuban regime and the threat which its close ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc portended for the hemisphere. Setting up the United States proposals for action against Cuba, he said:

I suggest we move in four directions. First, we must recognize that the alignment of Cuba with the Sino-Soviet countries . . . are incompatible with the purposes and principles of the inter-American system . . . and are an ever present danger to the peace and security of the continent. Second, we must make the policy decision to exclude the Castro regime from the organs and bodies of the inter-American system /including specifically the Inter-American Defense Board/. Third, we must interrupt the limited but significant flow of trade between Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere, especially the traffic in arms. Fourth, we must set in motion a series of individual and communal acts of defense against the various forms of political and direct aggression mounted against the hemisphere"

Mr. Rusk called in particular for the establishment of a special security committee to recommend measures for protection against any acts of aggression resulting from intervention of the Sino-Soviet Powers or others associated with them.³⁸

President Dorticos of Cuba, in a lengthy reply to Mr. Rusk, declared that the conference had no legal basis

³⁸ OEA/Ser.F/11.3, Doc. 35, pp. 10-11.

and that "international law had been treated with contempt for a precise end to condemn and isolate Cuba and encourage the counter-revolutionaries in their hope of destroying the Cuban revolution." Polemical as the bulk of his reply was, it frequently struck chords of sympathy and understanding among the Latin American delegates and had undeniable appeal to those wary of the United States. "We all know that this meeting is not directed against Cuba or the people of Cuba. It is aimed to prevent the movement of liberation and anti-imperialist groups." Cuba, he added with positive effect, had earlier denounced preparations for a rebel invasion in 1961 and "history proved us right." He defended summary executions in Cuba and claimed that human rights were "more real in Cuba than in the rest of the continent." He referred to the United States "where millions of Negroes live in subhuman situations." In conclusion, he plucked the strings of internal self-determination and non-intervention by saying that "Cuba will respect the right of others to develop themselves by capitalist methods. But we have taken the road of socialism, and there is no force in existence capable of making us turn back."³⁹

Private discussions continued throughout the week,

³⁹Ibid., Doc. 47.

interrupted only by formal speeches before the General Committee. As the meeting neared its close, the Uruguay delegates, who had been without a clear mandate from a divided collegiate executive at home and were represented by two opposing members of that body, reached a decision to support the suspension of Cuba from the OAS. Haiti, after its initial hesitation, decided that it, too, would go along. These were two votes which filled out the required two-thirds majority. Unanimity seemed hopeless, even on a very much watered-down resolution. Brazil and Mexico, in any case, remained adamant about denying support to any kind of sanctions. The general debate was not resolved.

With the aim of pursuing a compromise procedure for action against Cuba which would receive the maximum number of votes, the resumption of the general session was delayed until the evening of January 30. A proposal, modified with Mr. Rusk's collaboration, stating that the incompatibility of the present Cuban regime with the inter-American system must result automatically in her "exclusion"--thereby avoiding her direct expulsion by the conference itself--still proved inadequate to gain the support of six American states. Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico were unmoved.⁴⁰

⁴⁰Keesing's, op. cit., pp. 18, 714-718.

The legal arguments offered by these countries opposing exclusion of the Cuban government from the Inter-American system are found in the minutes of the meetings of the Council of the OAS where the proposed Meeting of Consultation was first debated.⁴¹ They are encountered again in the speeches delivered before the General Committee at Punta del Este.⁴² Finally, legal reservations were recorded by declarations of Mexico and Ecuador for inclusion in the final act and in the Acta de la Novena Sesión de la Comisión General.⁴³ Briefly summarized, they were these:⁴⁴

1. Article 6 of the Rio Treaty is not applicable to the case (discussed in Chapter III, supra).
2. Assuming the applicability of Article 6 of the Treaty, the sanctions listed in Article 8 do not include exclusion from the OAS of one of its members.
3. If exclusion is not specifically provided for, then the organization has no right to exclude a member without first amending the Charter.

⁴¹OEA/Ser.G/II/C-2-417.

⁴²OEA/Ser.F/II.8; Argentina, Doc. 42 (español); Mexico, Doc. 25 (español); Bolivia, Doc. 31 (español); Chile, Doc. 16 (English); Brazil, Doc. 32 (English).

⁴³Ibid., Doc. 70 (English); Doc. 72 (español).

⁴⁴Ronning, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

4. Article 34 of the Charter of the Organization of American States establishes the right of all member states to participate in the Inter-American Conference which is the primary organ of the inter-American system. The argument that only the government and not the state of Cuba is excluded is untenable because a state participates only by means of its government.

The arguments of those governments favoring exclusion of the Cuban government can be found in the documents of the sources cited above.⁴⁵ They may be summarized as follows:⁴⁶

1. Article 6 of the Rio Treaty is applicable to the Cuban case (discussed in Chapter III, supra).
2. The law of the Treaty must be able to establish not only the incompatibility of the present Cuban government with the inter-American system but the means of resolving that incompatibility as well.

⁴⁵OEA/Ser.P/II.8, op. cit., Colombia, Doc. 19 (English); Dominican Republic, Doc. 52 (English); El Salvador, Doc. 42 (español); Costa Rica, Doc. 54 (español); Venezuela, Doc. 36 (English); Peru, Doc. 38 (español); Panama, Doc. 37, (español).

⁴⁶Ronning, op. cit., p. 22.

3. The restrictive enumeration in Article 8 of the Rio Treaty refers more to Article 20 than to Article 6, precisely because of the unforeseen cases that Article 6 takes into account (Article 20 provides that the measures prescribed in Article 8 shall be binding, with the exception that no state shall be required to use armed force without its consent. Thus, presumably, Article 8 lists only those measures that are binding on all once a decision has been taken, and not possible measures that can be taken.)
4. It is necessary for a member to maintain a democratic republican form of government. Various resolutions can be cited that make it the obligation of each American state to practice "representative democracy." (This was a Costa Rican argument, which, needless to say, not all of the governments supporting sanctions would care to press.)
5. Cuba is not excluded from the OAS. Only the present government of Cuba is not permitted to participate.

Of the nine resolutions approved and included in the Final Act, substantial disagreement existed on only

two.⁴⁷ Resolution VI, Exclusion of the Present Government of Cuba from Participation in the Inter-American System, stated in its final form that the present Government of Cuba, which had officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government, was incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system; that by this incompatibility, it had excluded itself from participation in the inter-American system. The resolution obtained the bare two-thirds majority required.⁴⁸

Resolution VIII, Economic Relations, called for the immediate suspension of trade in arms with Cuba. It received seventeen votes as did the resolution excluding Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board. The conference also resolved "to reiterate its adherence to the principles of self-determination and non-intervention as guiding standards of coexistence among the American nations," (Resolution III); reaffirmed the urgent necessity for all American nations to "intensify immediately their self-help and cooperative efforts under the Alliance for Progress" (Resolution V); reaffirmed the need for holding free elections (Resolution IV); and provided for the

⁴⁷Pan American Union, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Final Act, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.8, 1962, Washington, D.C.

⁴⁸Keesing's, op. cit., pp. 18 and 715.

broadening and strengthening of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Resolution IX). Of special significance was the establishment of a Special Consultative Committee on Hemispheric Security Against the Subversive Action of International Communism. It was to act as an advisory body to the member governments which require and request its assistance to fight communist subversion (Resolution II).

All resolutions were incorporated in the Final Act of the Conference, which was adopted unanimously in Plenary Session on January 31, the Cuban delegation being absent.⁴⁹

Thus, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation showed a perhaps puzzling ambivalence between solidarity and discord. Puzzling because the declarations of principle upon which American solidarity had long rested were re-emphasized but failed to show a common, practical interpretation of what they meant. The evidence of discord was the mark of the depth of that dichotomy in interpretation.

⁴⁹OEA/Ser.C/II.8. (Final Act.)

CHAPTER V

THE CASE OF SOLIDARITY EVALUATED

There seems little doubt that those who called the meeting did so for the purpose of halting the advance of Sino-Soviet or communist influence and power into the Western Hemisphere. This advance was to be resisted like the "alien" incursions of the past which threatened the people of the New World in the form of the Holy Alliance and twentieth century Fascism.

In the days of the American colonies, there began to grow an ethos among peoples sharing the struggle for freedom from European rule and for personal liberty in a land of their own, which with each recurring threat to their new existence, drew them closer together in spirit and in mind against the old traditional source of chaos and tyranny in Europe. This strong negativism toward Europe seemed, in large measure, responsible for the positive solidarity of the "Western Hemisphere Idea." But even the author of this phrase has appended to it a sobering thesis which speaks of past glory, by a referral to "Its Rise and Decline."¹

¹Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1954).

The decline of this aspect of solidarity, based as it is on a separateness from Europe, was inevitable in an increasingly interdependent international system and particularly in the NATO regional system which linked rather than isolated Europe from the hemisphere.

From the fact of this new inter-dependence of national states stems other political factors inimicable to the traditional solidarity of the Americas. This concerns the great disparity between the highly industrialized nations and the underdeveloped emerging ones (in which category the Latin American republics basically inhere) and a new pattern of aspirations and requirements which pit the have-not nations against former allies and benefactors who are increasingly called upon to fulfill the rising expectations of the former. The continuing unsatisfied demands of the Latin Americans for economic aid from the United States have prompted them to turn outward to Europe and Asia for both commercial substance and for the purpose of applying political leverage against the United States. Taken together with the communist threat, the United States has belatedly undertaken the Alliance for Progress whose purpose is only incidentally to satisfy social and economic expectations of the Latin but to attack the long-run sources of communist appeal which thrive on poverty, hunger, and ignorance.

Herein is illustrated a basic difference of views. The Latins have long sought improvement in commerce, industry, and social and economic conditions by United States help. The United States, on the other hand, has been concerned primarily with the security of the hemisphere from extra-continental forces. Their security being provided by a strong northern neighbor, the Latins have developed a dissimilar emphasis which is focused on maintaining their autonomy from United States power while, at the same time, coveting United States affluence and imitating its institutions. Latin America expects that the United States should aid them in the realization and perfection of both by economic means. In a revolutionary era in which these expectations remain unfulfilled after centuries of misery, traditional ties and concepts are shaken to their foundations.

In preceding chapters, there have been traced only partially some of the political frictions manifest in mustering support against a communist threat to solidarity. Why, indeed, should Latins plunge wholeheartedly into a defense of the status quo which is not meeting their expectations? To many North Americans, this seems a question hard to understand, much less to answer. The sense of urgency which the United States has had toward the Communist threat has not been shared by its Latin neighbors.

It has appeared to them a struggle between major colossi which has only limited effect on their lives. They conceive that perhaps the promises of Marxism-Leninism could in many ways fulfill the expectation which aspiration to the principles of solidarity has failed to bring.

Latin-American aspirations for economic and social betterment has a long history. Throughout the association of these countries with a northern neighbor which had advanced rapidly and inexorably into the industrial age, they have emphasized the importance of this aspect in relations with the United States and have sought aid by Pan-Latin American bloc action to realize this end.² This single-mindedness has prevailed regardless of the subject the United States brought as most important to the inter-American conference table. At Caracas where a strong anti-communist resolution was paramount in the United States view, it still remained far surpassed by the longer standing economic questions. It remains to the present time, of transcendent importance. United States ignorance of its priority in the Latin estimation has been a strong source of cleavage adversely affecting solidarity.

²Northwestern University, United States-Latin American Relations, The Organization of American States, a study prepared by Professors George Blancksten, Harold Guetzkow and John Plan, for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 17.

In the course of gathering support for its anti-communist policy, the United States has tried to exchange economic aid for Latin cooperation. In this context, the Alliance for Progress has to prove much, and coming as comparatively little, too late, may fail to meet American expectations.

In the matter of anti-communist declarations, the United States found unanimous support so long as the issue was more nominal than real in this hemisphere. At the Fourth Meeting of Ministers in Washington in 1951, anti-communist solidarity seemed at its peak. So long as the threat remained extra-continental, the hemisphere, almost to a man, was willing to present a solid front of condemnatory declarations. When the issue became an intra-hemisphere problem, however, and action not words were required, the latent fear and perhaps hatred of a powerful United States paralyzed collective action. Solidarity retreated to the wings and the principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty claimed the center of the stage.

The case of Guatemala had an important impact in that Latin America had dramatized for the first time that declarations against the communist threat to solidarity would require some sort of active intervention in the affairs of a neighboring state if they were to be more

than mere words. At this crucial juncture, the American states refused collective reinterpretation of the non-intervention principle and cast the die for divided opinion on Cuba.

International tensions in the Western Hemisphere built up to an unprecedented scale after January 1959. The primary cause of these tensions seems to have been the Castro regime of Cuba. The Organization of American States, as the only lawful and politically acceptable instrument for the revitalization of deteriorating solidarity, was faced with a dilemma. How can anti-communist declarations be turned to effective action without violating the narrow definition seemingly inseparably attached to national sovereignty among a group of nations paradoxically committed to a system of collective security. By Declaration of San José, the inter-American system steadfastly refused to meet the problem head on. It deflected its anti-communist ire extra-continently, and Mexico was joined by Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and, at least tacitly, by Brazil in exceedingly patient and charitable utterances toward Cuba.

When the first truly revolutionary movement in the post-war hemisphere swept Cuba, it enjoyed much popular favor throughout the hemisphere. When it was captured by international Communism which brought the island of Cuba

into a dependency-alliance relationship with the Soviet Union unique in Pan-American history, much of the hemisphere continued to take vicarious delight in the fact that a small Caribbean island so long under United States hegemony had been deftly plucked from the nest. Coming as this did at the expense of the tyrannous Batista dictatorship formerly abetted by the United States, the forces of populism and nationalism responded in a way which was inimicable to the United States policy of sanctions against Cuba; it made compromise imperative.

Therefore, the formula of "incompatibility" which emerged from the Punta del Este Conference represented a compromise between sanctions and non-intervention; between the United States view that the very existence of a Communist government in the hemisphere constitutes aggression and the predominant Latin American view that the internal and external affairs of a state are not the subject of intervention. The groundwork for the acceptance of this concept had been laid in the history of the inter-American system, with its repeated avowals that free representative governments are the basis of American solidarity, and in the system's increasing concern over the penetration of international Communism. But acceptance by the conference of the incompatibility formula was preliminary to Cuba's expulsion from the Organization of American States, and

here the six parted company with the United States. They opposed expulsion as juridically unsound and politically unacceptable.

President John F. Kennedy declared himself well pleased with the results of the Conference at Punta del Este, and he warmly congratulated Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Mr. Rusk's report to the nation pointed out that for the first time all the American states--except Cuba, of course--had denounced the concept of Marxism-Leninism as being incompatible with the inter-American system; Cuba had been condemned by name in far stronger terms than at previous conferences.³ These were two important advances as the inter-American system goes, but far short of the action required to meet an increasingly urgent situation.

Cuba boasted of a victory of sorts at the conference, and it must be admitted that, in the short-term at least, her "victory" was the more apparent and may be the more telling. President Dorticós claimed that the conference had been "a defeat for the imperialist Government of the United States" and that the United States of America "having arrived at Punta del Este demanding severe sanctions against Fidel Castro's regime, has had to draw back

³Dean Rusk, Report to the Nation: The Punta del Este Conference, Department of State Pamphlet (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), 2 February 1962.

and accept minimum results obtained at the cost of internal division with the pan-American system.'⁴

Dorticós' conception of the United States defeat seemed supported by many United States and foreign newspapers which reflected the disappointment of the conference's results. The New York Times commented that

. . . it was generally accepted that the President /Kennedy/ was putting the best face on this disappointment /and that/ many diplomats privately, and some members of Congress publicly, were voicing doubts about the conference's substantive achievements.⁵

For the Latin Americans, the most significant feature of the conference was the emergence of a group, including the largest and most democratic states in Latin America, which held to an independent line in the face of great pressure.⁶ On the other hand, the United States was supported by the smaller and weaker states which number in their ranks the least democratic elements in the hemisphere. These facts bode ill for the success of United States policies involving the hemispheric system. The Good Neighbor policy was formulated to secure United States objectives through goodwill engendered by the

⁴Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 21-28 April 1962, p. 18, 713.

⁵Quoted in ibid.

⁶G. Connell-Smith, "The Future of the OAS," The World Today, Vol. 18, No. 3, March 1962, p. 119.

exercise of restraint in her relations with her weaker neighbors. The Alliance for Progress is a new manifestation of an old goodwill seeking its realization through economic and social cooperation. In this connection, the United States is called upon to do far more for her neighbors in return for substantially less than full attainment of her major policy objectives.

Preoccupied with Communism in the rest of the world, the potential threat inherent in post-war economic and social revolution had tended to be ignored in Latin America. Only after becoming convinced of the threat to Western Hemisphere nations, did the United States act to favor this revolution to which so much attention had been directed in Europe. In the meantime, the Cold War tended to be viewed by Latin America as essentially a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁷ That is to say, that international Communism was directed more at United States hegemony than at hemispheric security. These factors strengthened the idea of a mutual reciprocity: economic aid from the United States in return for political support of her policies. The connection between the United States, Cuba and the "Alianza para el Progreso" is

⁷ Mildred Adams, Latin America: Evolution or Explosion (New York: Dodd & Mead, 1963); Roberto de Oliveira Campos, "Relations Between the US and Latin America," p. 38.

an example of this idea. There is irony in this arrangement, in that the ruling elite in Latin America, with whom the "self-help" aspects of the Alliance are entrusted for execution, is the very group which has the most to lose immediately by the success of the economic and social reforms intended.⁸ Whether the ruling classes of the Americas can be persuaded that it is in their own long-term interest to accept a reduction in their personal privilege for the success of the Alliance for Progress and the betterment of their respective nations remains to be seen.⁹

Of greater significance is the fact that it is the ruling class in Latin America from whom has been drawn the greatest sympathy and support for the United States policies against communism in the hemisphere; it is this group which has expressed the strongest desire to see Castro overthrown. All this points up a basic weakness in the United States position: the elements in Latin America lending the strongest support in the relatively short-term strategy against Castro are least likely to support the aims of the Alliance for Progress which is the long-term policy for combating communism in the hemisphere.

⁸ Adams, op. cit., p. 52.

⁹ Ibid., Chester Bowles, "A New Deal for Latin America," p. 109.

Faced with the dire consequences of further Communist success in the hemisphere, the stated fundamental values of the inter-American system must become active programs of defense against the subversion of democracy. At present the great obstacle to concerted action is the supremacy of the dogma of absolute sovereignty, on non-intervention, which may prove to have been maintained at incalculable cost to the well being of the hemisphere.¹⁰ Internal self-determination is a respected ideal; but when the state elects as its symbol the communist myth, it automatically relinquishes its self-determining aspects and comes under the determinants of international Communism.

It is possible to view the incompatibility formula as a step further toward some firm legal obligations backed by adequate sanctions to assure the growth of that democracy which Dr. Larreta has asserted is so essential to peace in the hemisphere.¹¹ The acceptance of this formula was a success for United States diplomacy at the conference--and a significant one--considering the internal

¹⁰A. J. Thomas and Ann V. Thomas, "Democracy and the OAS," Minnesota Law Review, Vol. XLVI, 1961-1962 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1962), p. 381.

¹¹Pan American Union, Consultation of the Government of Uruguay and Replies of the Governments on the Parallelism Between Democracy and Peace, The International Rights of Man and Collective Action in Defense of those Principles (Washington, D. C., 1946).

political tensions in Latin America militating against any support of United States proposals affecting a sister republic.¹² The United States Senate was lavish in its praise of the diplomatic prowess of Secretary of State Dean Rusk.¹³ But it cannot be said that marginally supported declarations will alone be successful in maintaining solidarity against Communism. Moral condemnation of Cuba could not be less effective against a government cut loose from its hemispheric ties. If democracy is to be defended and the intervention of Communism is to be expelled, the inter-American system must be expedited toward the consensus so vital to definitive action.

Can such a consensus be achieved before freedom in the hemisphere is mortally undermined? If it cannot, given the decades it has taken to build the most enduring and effective regional system in modern history, at what point should expediency supersede consent. The United States is the primary source of economic, political, and military power in the hemisphere. The United States desires to preserve and strengthen the inter-American community by seeking multi-lateral support of her policies

¹²Adams, loc. cit.; Campos, op. cit., p. 39.

¹³United States Congress, Senate, Record of the 87th Congress, Second Session, February 2, 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 1,395.

by its membership, is a vital and necessary policy. But it is tending to give second priority to the consideration of hemispheric security. In spite of the many fine resolutions and reaffirmations of democratic principle, the inter-American system cannot survive meaningfully if such avowals are not backed with actions that implement them. Idealistic principle must not be out of touch with pragmatic political fact. Unless the legalistic framework within which the OAS functions is backed by a dynamic and practical political consensus about the purposes of its existence, it may be progressively eroded to the point of absurdity. Consent and not coercion is the sounder basis for lasting progress, but the United States must bear the responsibility for the success--or failure--of either course. If hemispheric consensus is tardy in marshalling to meet the threat, stern and vigorous measures may be necessary to meet it with less than unanimous approval by all the members of the OAS. The late President John F. Kennedy once said:

Should it ever appear that the Inter-American doctrine of non-intervention merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction--if the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration--then . . . this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are the security of our Nation.¹⁴

¹⁴United States Department of State, Bulletin, 8 May 1961, quoting John F. Kennedy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 659.

Such national necessity could sound the death knell of the Organization and, in the long run, prove as detrimental to national as well as hemisphere security as the event which brought it to pass.

On the horns of this dilemma rests the future of the Organization of American States and the solidarity and security of the Western Hemisphere.

I. CONCLUSION

The concept of solidarity has been without a symbol. It defines a system of socially accepted beliefs about a political way of life which has failed to find symbolic representation in the institutional form of the Organization of American States or in a realization of a major portion of its principles. The element of what Plato called mythos, without implication of falsity, underlies the concept of the solidarity of the Americas. It was born of circumstances and served to provide a rallying point for hemisphere aspirations to life, liberty, and property for the individual which only the United States has thus far achieved with any degree of perfection. To the underdeveloped nations of Latin America, the principles of hemispheric solidarity remain largely anticipatory, and like many of their national constitutions, only fond avowals which are out of touch with the real probability

that they can take on practical political existence in the form envisaged.

The real paradox confronting the case is that the very principles themselves upon which the notion of solidarity is founded are those which tend to fragment American solidarity. The principles of non-intervention, sovereignty, and close economic cooperation for social, cultural and ultimately political unity are mutually incompatible in the transitional environment of changing international political relationships. There seems considerable evidence that, to Latin Americans, solidarity has become only another name for imperialist domination.

It is reasonable to observe with pride and some reverence that there has existed in the past, and persists in the present, an international mythos among free, sovereign states charged with a wide range of the emotions elicited by Western liberal political belief. Through this belief, loyalty is inspired to the abstract symbol of freedom in unity under peace and law in the Western Hemisphere.

This mystique is sorely tried by the times and at present is shaken profoundly by a violently transitional environment. W. W. Rostow asserts that one must begin by assuming that a transitional society is in a profound disequilibrium and pose the question: What patterns and

rates of change are most consistent with the maintenance of social continuity? Or, in operational terms, by what process can the transitional be fulfilled in ways which avoid violent civil conflict and minimize a society's vulnerability to external and internal aggression?¹⁵

Realizing that the principles of inter-American solidarity can thrive only in an atmosphere of reasonable stability and order, it would serve United States policymakers well to remember also a fact which Guglielmo Ferrero has noted in writing of the reconstruction of Europe. Directing his attention to the period of great national and international change after 1815, marked by the revolutionary spirit of France, he makes an observation apropos of the contemporary scene:

One of the greatest mistakes committed by human indolence is the belief that order is best preserved by keeping it as it stands. The only real guardians are those who reconstruct it.¹⁶

¹⁵W. W. Rostow, "The Policymakers View of Transitional Societies," United States Department of State Bulletin, 24 September 1962.

¹⁶Guglielmo Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), p. 342.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

The official records of the Punta del Este Meeting comprise seventy-six documents and have been published only in Spanish. An English version only partially complete--since all official documents of the conference proceedings were not translated from the original Spanish to English--may be found in the Columbus Memorial Library at the Pan American Union, Washington, D. C. These volumes and other documents and publications listed below supplied the factual documentation for the case study of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation and most of the background associated therewith.

1. Publications of the Pan American Union

Pan American Union. Acta de la Sesión Extraordinaria Celebrada el 4 de diciembre de 1961. Washington, 1961. OEA/Ser.G/II/C-2-427.

_____. Octava Reunion de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores. Punta del Este, Uruguay, 22 a 31 de enero de 1962. Actas y Documentos. Washington, 1963. OEA/Ser.F/III.8.

_____. Consultation of the Government of Uruguay and Replies of the Governments on the Parallelism Between Democracy and Peace, the International Rights of Man and Collective Action in Defense of Those Principles. Washington, 1946.

_____. Organization of American States, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Punta del Este, Uruguay, 1962, Acts and Documents 1-76. OEA/Ser.F/II.8. Washington, 1962.

_____. Pamphlet. Charter of the Organization of American States. Washington, 1948.

_____. Report of the Rapporteur of the Second Committee of the Rio Conference. Doc. CRJ/130.CII/24, 30 August 1947, Washington.

_____. Special Consultative Committee on Security Against the Subversive Action of International Communism, Initial General Report 1962. Washington, 1962. OEA/Ser. L/X/11.1.

2. United States Government Reports and Publications

United States Congress, Senate, Record of the 87th Congress, Second Session, February 2, 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962).

United States Department of Commerce. United States Business Investment in Foreign Countries. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960.

United States Department of State. Bulletin. 25 December 1961. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961.

_____. Cuba. Publication 7171, Inter-American Series 66, April 1961. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961.

_____. Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security. Publication 3016, International Conference Series II. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948.

_____. Inter-American Efforts to Relieve International Tensions in the Western Hemisphere 1959-1960. Publication 7409, July 1962. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962.

_____. Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, March 1-28, 1954. Report of the Delegation of the United States of America with related documents. Publication 5692. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955.

_____. The Castro Regime in Cuba. Pamphlet, August 1961. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961.

3. United Nations Documents

United Nations. Document A/C 1/1866, letter from the Cuban Representative to the President of the General Assembly. New York, 1962.

_____. Document A/Res/1616 (XV). New York, April 1961.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

The books, articles, newspapers, periodicals and miscellaneous publications and reports listed below each served to enrich the fruit of research. All have been cited in the text and, consequently, are only a partial list of sources of information and inspiration to which credit is due for contributions to this thesis. Of particular value were the writings on the Punta del Este Conference by G. Connell-Smith and C. Neale Ronning. These represent two astute evaluations of a meeting which has not inspired exhaustive dissertation. The books by Arthur P. Whitaker made special contribution to the development of the theme of solidarity.

1. Books

Adams, Mildred. Latin America: Evolution or Explosion. New York: Dodd & Mead, 1963.

Alexander, Robert J. Communism in Latin America. First edition. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1959.

Bemis, Samuel F. The Latin American Policy of the United States. New York: Harcourt-Brace, 1943.

Davis, Harold E. Government and Politics in Latin America. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958.

Draper, Theodore. Castro's Revolution. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

Dreier, John C. The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

Eisenhower, Milton S. The Wine is Bitter. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963.

Elliott, William Y. and Neil A. MacDonald. Western Political Heritage. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1949.

- Houston, John A. Latin America in the United Nations. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956.
- Lockey, Joseph B. Pan Americanism: Its Beginnings. The Macmillan Company, 1920.
- Marshall, Charles Burton. The Limits of Foreign Policy. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1954.
- Mecham, J. Lloyd. The United States and Inter-American Security, 1829-1960. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1962.
- Porter, Charles O. and Robert J. Alexander. The Struggle for Democracy in Latin America. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961.
- Rippy, Fred J. Globe and Hemisphere. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1958.
- Schmitt, Karl M. and David D. Burks. Evolution or Chaos, Dynamics of Latin American Government and Politics. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.
- Thomas, A. J. and Ann Van W. The Organization of American States. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963.
- Weinberg, Albert K. Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History. Baltimore: The Macmillan Company, 1935.
- Whitaker, Arthur P. (ed.). Latin America and the Enlightenment. New York: Cornell University Press, 1961.
- _____. The Western Hemisphere Idea. New York: Cornell University Press, 1954.
- _____. Nationalism in Latin America. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962.
2. Articles and reports from publications of the United States Government, Learned Societies and other Organizations
- Connell-Smith, G. "The Future of the OAS," The World Today. Vol. 18, No. 3, March 1962.

Eisenhower, Milton S. Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations. Department of State Publication 5290, Inter-American Series 47, December 1953. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953.

Facts on File. Vol. XV, No. 1028, 7-13 July 1960. New York.

_____. Vol XXI, No. 1071, 27 April-3 May, 1961. New York.

Goldenberg, Boris. "The Cuban Revolution: An Analysis," Problems of Communism. United States Information Agency, Vol. XII, No. 5, September-October 1963. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963.

Halperin, Ernst. "Castroism-Challenge to the Latin American Communists," Problems of Communism. United States Information Agency, Vol. XII, No. 5, September-October, 1963. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives. 21-28 April 1962.

Kennedy, John F. Speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at the National Press Club on 20 April 1961. Quoted in Department of State Bulletin, 8 May 1961, pp. 659ff.

Mezerik, A. G. (ed.). Cuba and the United States. Vols. I & II. New York: International Review Service, Vol. I, 1960; Vol. II, 1963.

Northwestern University. United States-Latin American Relations, the Organization of American States. A study prepared by Professors George Blancksten, Harold Guetzkow and John Plank for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959.

Ronning, C. Neale. Punta del Este: The Limits of Collective Security in a Troubled Hemisphere. Occasional paper number 3. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1963.

Rostow, W. W. "The Policymakers View of Transitional Societies," United States Department of State Bulletin, 24 September 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962).

Rusk, Dean. Report to the Nation: The Punta del Este Conference. United States Department of State, pamphlet. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2 February 1962.

Suárez, Andres. "Castro Between Moscow and Peking," Problems of Communism. United States Information Agency, Vol. XII, No. 5, September-October, 1963. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963.

Thomas, A. J. and Ann Van W. "Democracy and the OAS," Minnesota Law Review, Vol. XLVI, 1961-1962. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1962.

3. Press Release

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Embassy Press Release. No. 330, 9 July 1960, Washington, D. C.

4. Newspapers

El Dia, Montevideo, 24 January 1962.

"G.V." El Dia, Montevideo, 28 de Enero de 1962.

La Nacion, Buenos Aires, 29 January 1962.

La Prensa, Buenos Aires, 23 January 1962.

New York Times, 13 July 1960; 19 November 1960; 3 December 1961; 26, 28, 31 January 1962; 1, 4, 14, 16 February 1962.



thes.J668

The concept of inter-American solidarity



3 2768 002 10567 8

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY